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ABSTRACT
Subjects or Rebels:
The Dominion of New England and the Roots of Anglo-American Conflict
This paper argues that the process by which the English Crown’s initially modest
attempts to tweak New England colonial governance dovetailed into a
reactionary denial of all colonial liberties. The imposition of autocratic imperial
rule and armed occupation of New England reflects the fundamental bankruptcy
of the “imperial constitution,” namely, the incompatibility of the right of colonists to
representative assemblies and the imperial authority of the English state.
Because on a constitutional level the two were incompatible, a protracted conflict
between colonists and metropolitans had a strong likelihood of ending in logical
extremes neither party expected or wanted: the abolition of colonial selfgovernment by the English state and a revolutionary attack on the authority of the
English state by colonists. As long as colonists and metropolitans failed to
reconcile colonial rights with metropolitan sovereignty, they papered over a zero
sum game. This paper is preliminary and based upon an initial reading of
sources; additional research of contemporary scholarship in particular would
improve it.

ABSTRACT
The Right to Fortifications:
American Communities and the Politics of Harbor Defense: 1794-1812
This paper argues that American seaport towns played an outsized and
determinative role in the fortification of their harbors in the immediate postrevolutionary period. While historians have examined the individual and collective
efforts of military engineers during this period, they have neglected the
importance of the labor, financial and political resources of cities in realizing
seacoast defense. I found strong connections between urban politics and urban
seacoast fortifications at every level from grassroots community organizations to
the halls of Congress. To complete this project and properly qualify its
conclusions, however, a comprehensive analysis of legislative dynamics and
seaport populations would be necessary. This paper might serve as the nucleus
of future research on the relationship between American communities and
fortifications.
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INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY
Fortifications, Communities and Politics
My primary research interest is the intersection between community, military
and political history, in particular around the fortifications of early North American
colonists.
One of my chief interests is the relationship between different tiers of
government in relation to problems of defense and security. I believe that such a
study challenges many accounts in which local participation is underplayed and
high-level central involvement is exaggerated. In my undergraduate thesis, “The
Politics of the Gate: Byzantine City Walls and the Urban Negotiation of Imperial
Authority,” I looked at Byzantine towns and their fortifications, and how the role
populaces played as defenders of those fortifications and ultimately as decisionmakers on decisions over whether to resist or surrender, and how this popular
power affected their political and military relationship with the Emperor in
Constantinople.
My general belief is that in many areas fortifications (whether they defend a
great metropolis or a small cabin) have a much stronger relationship with the
people who actually defend them and are defended by them than is commonly
acknowledged by historians. I believe the rich interactions around military
architecture can be deeply revealing about the basic structure and culture of a
given society. I also believe, in the early modern and premodern context at the
very least, in the importance of recognizing that important settlements were
almost universally fortified strongholds in every settled society on earth.

1

I am interested in how the division of fortified strongholds impacted
societies. Such ramifications can be political and economic, but also can involve
religion, culture and gender. I am particularly interested in exploring this last
facet: in much of the ancient world, fortifications were explicitly identified as
feminine, separating a domestic space of nurture from a masculine exterior
defined by conflict and danger just as the walls of the house have defined
domesticity in some cultures. Cultural and religious links between women and
fortifications have long been connected to the material reality that in numerous
societies (and certainly in colonial North America for the English, French,
Spanish and Indigenous peoples) landscapes were punctuated by fortified places
in which women, along with the young and the old of both genders, would
typically remain while male warriors conducted offensive and defensive warfare,
not to mention long-distance trade, diplomacy and exploration.
While military scholarship has long been interested in the conduct of male
warriors and concern themselves with fortified places only when men besiege or
defend them, I am interested in how the reality of fortification was experienced
not only by male warriors but by women and other noncombatants, who dealt
with loneliness of waiting for absent men, the frenzy of collective defense, the
weary privations of siege and the social catastrophe of the sack. Some scholars
have begun to productively explore such relationships, particularly in ancient and
medieval contexts, but such issues are very applicable to the various borderlands
of colonial North America and greater research is needed to define how the
people of different societies experienced these pressures at different times. Forts
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were certainly used for purposes besides civilian protection in early America,
such as advance bases for military garrisons. However, I believe scholars of both
European colonists and Indigenous nations who take close looks at community
history would benefit from enfolding defensive considerations into their historical
portraits.
In my two research papers so far, I examined two areas of my general
interest. In my first paper, “Subjects or Rebels: The Dominion of New England
and the Roots of Anglo-American Conflict,” I looked at late seventeenth century
New England and the relationship between colonial assemblies and the English
crown with an eye to how different tiers of government interacted with each other
in the colonial era. In my second paper, “The Right to Fortifications: American
Communities and the Politics of Harbor Defense, 1794-1812,” I looked more
directly at the relationship between communities and defense, in this case United
States seaports and harbor artillery fortifications in the immediate postrevolutionary republic. In this paper I pursued my interest in relationships
between local and higher government, looking at how seaport communities
agitated for fortifications on different political levels, from the federal to the local,
while also looking at direct popular participation in building them. This paper
sketched political relationships between communities and the construction of
military architecture but did not examine its actual use in wartime.
I am interested in focusing my research on a particularly pervasive but
understudied phenomenon, the proliferation of simple timber fortifications in the
North American borderlands, which applied to both English and Indigenous

3

people and less to other European powers: both Spain and France supplied their
colonies with professional engineers and built massive masonry fortifications to
protect their North American colonies rather than relying on local, unprofessional
initiative. In the future United States, timber garrisons, stockades and forts
defined the frontier from the first east coast foothold to the final Euroamerican
conquest of the continent. The scope of the task and the often localized and
impermanent nature of the evidence make a general study impossible, but I am
very interested in conducting some regional study after better familiarizing myself
with the relevant scholarship. Such a study would be useful, I hope, to our
knowledge of decentralized politics, gender, frontier warfare and community in
early North America.
In contemporary times, such a focus is relevant to studies of housing, class,
crime and security, with an eye towards real and imagined dangers to various
groups and the street grids, policing, border walls, gated communities and other
measures taken to secure against them. My interest in American security,
community and politics directly intersects with the history of policing, the second
amendment and modern housing segregation. Understanding the old world of
fortifications, community militias and night watches can illuminate such
contemporary concerns, which I would also liked to study if I had the opportunity.

4

Subjects or Rebels:
The Dominion of New England and the Roots of Anglo-American Conflict

Introduction: The Forgotten Viceroyalty
The late seventeenth century reign of Dominion of New England is an
undeservedly forgotten episode in American colonial and English imperial history.
It has virtually no presence in American popular culture, historical reenactments
or even high school history textbooks, which in their portraits of New England
tend to focus heavily on the Puritan commonwealth before and the birth of
revolution and independence after. One might expect this period to hold greater
public interest as the first great revolutionary clash between the supremacy of the
English empire and the rights of English colonists. In the 1680s, the English
Crown dissolved the colonies of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Plymouth, Connecticut, New York, West Jersey, East Jersey and Delaware and
absorbed them into one super-colony christened the Dominion of New England.1
The Crown also dissolved the previous colonial governments, which had been
mostly dominated by elected assemblies and placed all legislative, executive and
judicial powers in the hands of a single dictatorial governor, who was to rule from
Boston as viceroy of the Dominion on behalf of the king. The seventeenth
century progress of representative government in English America so important
to the revolutionary history of eighteenth century Europe and America was
entirely (if temporarily) overturned.
1

Viola Florence Barnes, The Dominion of New England, a Study in British Colonial Policy, (New
York: F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1960).
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Such a dramatic, autocratic change probably dismays a modern reader and
indeed, the Dominion of New England alarmed many people in the seventeenth
century as well. In 1684, the abolition of colonial assemblies was openly debated
in the English Privy Council before King Charles II. In this session, the defenders
of American assemblies, formerly dominant in royal councils, were of a decided
minority, and those advocating their abolition, recently ascendant in royal favor,
an overwhelming majority. In this council, the Marquess of Halifax—long the
most sincere and outspoken friend of colonial liberties in the English
government—risked royal displeasure to offer a passionate defense of
assemblies.2
Halifax declared that, “an absolute government is neither so happy nor so
safe, as that which is tempered by laws, and which sets bounds to the authority
of the prince.”3 Halifax argued that the colonists, as Englishmen, were entitled to
all the rights and liberties of Englishmen at home and finished with the rousing
statement that he himself would not “live under a King, who should have it in his
power to take, when ever he thought proper, the money he has in his pocket.”4 In
his speech, Halifax used the language of the seventeenth-century English theory
of limited monarchy: that kings should be restrained by the power of elected
legislatures from invading the liberties and properties of their subjects. Halifax
articulated in rousing terms the opinions of the party of English politicians and
bureaucrats who had up to this point directed imperial policy towards England’s
2

H. C. Foxcroft, 1865-, and George Savile Halifax, The Life and Letters of Sir George Savile,
Bart., First Marquis of Halifax, [Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1973, 428.
3

Ibid.

4

Ibid.
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American colonists in the Lords of Trade and Plantations (the pseudodepartmentalized Privy Council committee charged with colonial affairs of which
Halifax was a highly active member).5 6 7
This group supported Halifax’s ethical defense of assemblies with legal and
fiscal reasons. According to English law, as Englishmen, colonists could not be
deprived of their right to assemblies, they pointed out. They cited England’s
Attorney General’s report that notwithstanding any changes in administration, the
New Englanders could not be deprived of the right “to consent to such laws and
taxes as shall be made in New England.”8 Moreover, they argued, colonial
assemblies were cost-efficient, placing the expenses of administration and
defense on colonists rather than the mother country. Assemblies were also
universally beloved by colonists, and removing them would make governing them
by some other means prohibitively burdensome.9 Justice, Finance and Legality
would seem to support the presence of robust elected assemblies given authority
over legislation and taxation in England’s American colonies.
The pro-assembly argument of Halifax and his party was opposed in the
Privy Council session of 1684 by a group who argued that the right of colonists to
assent to or reject taxation through assemblies was inimical to the prerogative of
the English crown, and far from being protected by English law, was in fact the
5

The organization and personnel of the Lords of Trade and its relation to its institutional
successors and predecessors is best described by Winifred T. Root in “The Lords of Trade and
Plantations, 1675-1696,” (The American Historical Review 23, no. 1, 1917: 20-41) and by Ralph
P. Bieber in “The Lords of Trade and Plantations, 1675-1696,” (H.R. Haas & Co.).
6

Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations, Nov 22, 1684, CO 391/5, 35-39.

7

Lords of Trade and Plantations to the Lord President, Aug 26, 1685, CO 5/904, 251.

8

Ibid.

9

Edward Randolph to Lords of Trade and Plantations, Boston, Aug 23, 1686, CO 1/60, No. 32,
and CO 5/904, 332-335.
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chief obstacle to its successful implementation in the colonies.
The future James II, in 1684 Duke of York and heir to the throne, did not
rise to oppose Halifax, but it was he who was the leader of this anti-assembly
party in court.10 In a matter of days James used Halifax’s outburst to argue to
Charles II that Halifax ought to be dismissed as an obvious enemy of the
monarchy.11 Indeed, James’s anti-assembly party carried the day in the privy
council session of 1684, and early the next year Charles II signed a document
abolishing all New England assemblies.
James II’s explanation for this opposition to assemblies can be found in
correspondence from the previous decade, in which as proprietor of the newly
conquered colony of New York, he wrote to his colony’s governor, a Sir Edmund
Andros, commanding him not to allow the colonists any representation in
government. James wrote that he suspected that “an assembly would be of
dangerous consequence, nothing being more known than the aptness of such
bodies to assume privileges destructive to the peace of the Government.”12
There was, he wrote “no need for them” as long as the “Governor & Council
govern according to English laws established.”13
James was not alone in his opinion, and when he shortly became king in
1685, he would ensure that it was turned into reality, appointing like-minded
associates like the Earl of Sunderland to the Lords of Trade and purging it of men
10

Richard R. Johnson, Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715, (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1981), 54-55 and W. A. Speck, James II,
(London: Longman, 2002), 130.
11

Johnson, Adjustment to Empire, 54-55.

12

Barnes, The Dominion of New England: A Study in Colonial Policy, 40.

13

Ibid.
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like the Marquess of Halifax.14 The politics of James and his party were forged by
their experience of revolution and rebellion in two nations. James, like his brother
Charles and many royalists, fled England during the period of republican rule for
France. But while the future Charles II and his court held themselves aloof from
French politics, James became deeply involved in suppressing the Fronde, a
massive revolt against Cardinal Mazarin and Anne of Austria’s regency of the
young Louis XIV.15 James associated with the regency court and openly enlisted
in the French army, declaring that the Frondeurs fought from the same traitorous
motives as the English Parliamentarians.16 From his close acquaintance with
supporters of the regency (he may have even befriended the young King Louis),
James adopted the philosophy best articulated by Cardinal Mazarin, that
autonomous assemblies (whether elected by the people or self-constituted by
nobles) were inherently treasonous and should be allowed to exist in the body
politic.17
As a result of temperament as well as experience, James was politically
“incapable of differentiating between varying degrees of opposition” and saw “all
opposition” as “subversive and republican.”18 James believed assemblies were
inherently enemies to monarchs simply because they were capable of voting
against him, making them, in James’s “black and white” conception of the world
14

Bieber, “The Lords of Trade & Plantations,” 34.

15

James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern France, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 65-78.
16

Philip A. Knachel, England and the Fronde; the Impact of the English Civil War and Revolution
on France, (Ithaca, New York: Published for the Folger Shakespeare Library by Cornell University
Press, 1967), 230.
17

Knachel, England and the Fronde, 79.

18

John Miller, James II, ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 12.
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his enemies.19 In James’s words, “he that is not with me is against me.”20 As an
important courtier and the as king, James II would employ this conception of
government wherever he was able.
In 1686, the plans of James II became reality when Edmund Andros, first
and only governor general of the Dominion of New England, arrived in Boston
and received the surrender of an interim local government. Andros travelled to
the other former colonies, confiscating charters, seals and any other symbols of
independent political identity. Town meetings, jury trials and all other democratic
elements of colonial politics were also extinguished. Andros quickly earned the
hatred of virtually the entire population of colonists for his high-handed
authoritarianism and a lasting reputation for mustache-twirling villainy in local
folklore.21 The Dominion—backed by the first English redcoats on North
American soil and the potential might of the English state—lasted for two years
but was violently overthrown by colonists in 1688 when James II lost his throne to
William and Mary in the “Glorious Revolution.”
Historians have generally argued that the wrong side won the debate of
1684, and judged the Marquess of Halifax’s arguments in favor of colonial
assemblies superior to those of James II against them. Richard Johnson argues
in Accommodation to Empire that the Dominion of New England was badly
designed in ignorance of existing realities, an eccentricity he contrasts with the
more “hardheaded and practical” approach taken from 1675-1685, the period
19

John Miller, James II, ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 12.

20

Ibid, 12.

21

See the Victorian popular history book Our Country A Household History for the story of
Connecticut’s Charter Oak (pp. 449) and other pieces of Dominion folklore.
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during which support for colonial assemblies was dominant in the Lords of
Trade.22 Johnson argues that Halifax’s supporters correctly recognized the
“difficulties likely to attend the maintenance and funding of a government lacking
the hallowed and convenient procedures for popular participation and consent”
which James II failed to notice.23 Viola Barnes in The Dominion of New England:
a Study in Colonial Policy, characterizes the lack of an assembly as the Achilles
heel of the Dominion which doomed it to an early end. In his study of the Lords of
Trade and Plantations, Ralph Paul Bieber characterizes the Dominion period as
a low point for the Lords of Trade, and James II’s appointees as a group of
arbitrary and incompetent political hacks.24 One of James’s biographers, John
Callow, is equally negative, calling James’s theory of colonial government “oldfashioned, autocratic and ultimately spectacularly unsuccessful” and generally
characterizing James as an ignorant amateur imperialist.25
While some historians do credit the consolidation and centralization aspects
of the Dominion as impressive, almost none judge his abolition of assemblies a
wise piece of statesmanship. The Anglo-American future, according to these
historians, belonged to the defenders of assemblies, to an eighteenth century
world of representative institutions and limited monarchs, not to despots and rigid
mercantilism but to free trade, liberalism and revolution. One can hear clearly the
voice of the dark past one side and the bright future on the other.

22

Johnson, Adjustment to Empire, 64.

23

Ibid.

24

Ralph Paul Bieber, “The Lords of Trade & Plantations,” 34.

25

John Callow, The Making of King James II: The Formative Years of a Fallen King, (Stroud,
Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2000), 282.
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However, this paper will argue, as some historians have (somewhat
obliquely) realized, that James Stuart was in fact infinitely closer to the objective
truth of the imperial relationship than the Marquess of Halifax. This is because,
however much Halifax and other liberal-minded, Whiggish English imperialists
praised constitutional monarchs, the rights of Englishmen and the common
interest of empire, such beatitudes concealed a fundamental and unbridgeable
contradiction between the right of colonists to consent to or reject all taxation
through their assemblies and the supremacy of English law over all colonists.
James’s belief that lawmaking colonial assemblies were obstacles to English law
that there was simply not enough room in the empire for both such assemblies
and the powers of the crown was in fact an entirely accurate summary of the
constitutional crisis which would drive the English and their colonists into open
warfare, first in 1688 and then in 1775, if we but Parliament sub for the Crown.
The struggle over the Dominion anticipated the American Revolution in that
it showed that if colonial assemblies refused to accept English laws and the
English government wished to enforce them anyway, the English government
would be driven to abandon its liberal adherence to the rights of Englishmen,
constitutional monarchy and the common interests of the empire and to
annihilate the colonial right to an assembly. Such autocracy would in turn drive
the colonists—however closely they held Englishness, empire and the king—to
define the right to be taxed only by one’s elected representatives as an inherent
individual right, in defense of which an individual might legitimately oppose his
government by force.

12

Chapter I: From “Commonwealth” to “His Majesty’s Colony”
While they had believed the existence of both could be reconciled, during
the reign of Charles II, imperial administrators found that they could not
implement imperial commercial policies on defiant colonists as long as those
colonists retained assemblies with control over taxation.
The English administrators in the Lords of Trade believed that they could
secure colonial obedience to their mercantile and proprietary goals without
annihilating the right of all Englishmen, including colonists, to consent or reject to
all taxation and legislation by means of elected assemblies. The Lords of Trade
believed that the correct means of securing obedience from Massachusetts was
to transform that colony from a republican commonwealth masquerading as a
private trading company into a proper royal colony. Within this scheme, colonial
assemblies were not to be destroyed, but rather brought back into a proper
relation of loyal subordination towards the English government and their
representatives.
When he arrived in Boston in 1675 as agent to the Lords of Trade, Edward
Randolph found that Massachusetts conducted its affairs as an independent
nation, rejecting the proprietary claims of Mason and Gorges and trading freely
with other nations in open defiance of the Navigation Acts of 1673.26 When, over
the course of the next few years, Randolph and the Lords of Trade attempted to
cajole, bully and persuade the Massachusetts government to enforce the acts
and accept proprietary claims, they were met with evasion and refusal.
26

Answer of Edward Randolph to several heads of inquiry concerning the present state of New
England, Oct 12, 1676, CO 1/37, No. 70 also CO 5/903, pp. 114-161 and CO 391/1, 250.
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The Massachusetts assembly’s rejection of imperial laws did not lead
Randolph to the belief that these laws could only be implemented by denying
Massachusetts colonists the right to an assembly. Rather, Randolph came to the
belief that the General Court did not actually represent New England’s political
will, but only a small, seditious “faction.” Through the “cunning pretences” of this
group of fanatical republicans, “whole herds of the meaner inhabitants are
frighted from their obedience to his Majesty into the toils of their unlimited
authority.”27 Randolph believed that the vast majority of the population, including
all classes and professions—“the very magistracy, clergy, army, merchants, and
commoners,”—was generally loyal, and should the crown release them from the
domination of the “faction,” this silent majority would gratefully submit to the
crown’s authority.28
Randolph’s belief that a relatively small group of Puritans ran the
government of Massachusetts exclusively was none too far from the mark. In
Massachusetts, while all positions were elected and had term limits, suffrage was
limited to active church members in good standing, roughly one fifth of the male
population.29 Moreover, Puritan magistrates held substantial powers even
independent of elected offices.30 Randolph claimed that large majorities in New
Hampshire and Maine complained of the “oppression and usurpation of the

27

Edward Randolph to Secretary Coventry, Boston, June 17, 1676, CO 1/37, No. 7.

28

Ibid.

29

Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, (Gloucester, Mass.:
Peter Smith, 1957), 167.
30

Osgood, The American Colonies, Volume I, 212-213.
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Boston magistrates” due to their limited suffrage and that thus they desired to be
placed under Mason and Gorges.31
Randolph argued that only reforming the constitution of Massachusetts to
resemble those of ordinary, obedient colonies could break the power of “the
faction” and bring Massachusetts to loyalty. The Lords of Trade largely accepted
Randolph’s view, and from 1675 to 1685, gradually attempted to effect this
transformation.
First, the assembly would need to be purged of the religious qualifications
that kept it in the hands of a small party of theocrats. If suffrage was made open
to all propertied men, Randolph not unreasonably argued, the small group of
Puritan magistrates would lose their dominance and the bulk of the population
would be able to express its views.
Second, the crown needed to regain control of the executive and judicial
branches of colonial government, namely the Governor and his Council (which in
most colonies served as an upper house, supreme court and governor’s cabinet)
and strengthen them. The governor needed to be made a royal appointee rather
than an elected official and the council, militia and local courts staffed at his
pleasure.32 Multiple “royal prerogatives” which had been “entrenched on” needed
to be regained.33 For one, the king needed to be made the subject of oaths of
allegiance rather than the assembly, a change which would immediately break

31

Report of Edward Randolph to the King, (Sept 20), 1676, CO 1/37, Nos. 54, 55 also CO 5/903,
162-173.
32

Edward Randolph to the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Feb 22), 1679, CO 1/43, No. 21.

33

Report of Edward Randolph to Lords of Trade and Plantations concerning the Massachusetts
Government, April 18, 1678, CO 1/42, No. 58; and CO 5/903, 267-275.
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the back of the “faction.” If thus, “all inhabitants taking the oath of allegiance (as
directed in the King's letters of April last) be admitted freemen, and all that refuse
the oath be ipso facto made uncapable of voting or acting as freemen,” any
diehard defenders of the old system would not only lose their monopoly on
suffrage, but lose their own suffrage.34 Next, the Lords of Trade ought to make
the governor a royally appointed rather than elected official. The militia and
council ought to be brought under the now royal governor’s control and staffed at
his pleasure. When the Lords of Trade prepared a new commission for the
colony’s government in the 1680s they planned to implement Randolph’s colonial
limited monarchy: a royally appointed governor and council balanced by an
elected assembly made loyal by broad suffrage requirements that broke the
republican faction’s control. New England’s independent mint, which produced
coins stamped with 1652 and “Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” would need to
be dissolved or brought under royal control. 35
Randolph believed that if these changes were made, an elected assembly
with the right to consent to taxation and legislation could be left in place. Such an
assembly—staffed by ordinary, loyal Englishmen and placed in its proper
balance with the royal branches of government—would offer no seditious
resistance to the reasonable edicts of the Lords of Trade.
The colonial constitution thus painted by Randolph and the Lords of Trade
conformed to the collective understanding among English politicians as to the

34

Edward Randolph to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, (Feb 22), 1679, CO 1/43, No. 21.

35

Answer of Edward Randolph to several heads of inquiry concerning the present state of New
England, Oct 12, 1676, CO 1/37, No. 70 also CO 5/903, pp. 114-161 and CO 391/1, 250.
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proper relationship between colonies and the English motherland. Colonists,
ought to retain certain self-government due to the inconveniences of distance
and their own legal rights as Englishmen. However, colonies ought to be useful
to the greater English empire, acting as sources of useful exotic bulk goods and
markets for English manufactures.
The paramount goals of Restoration-era English intervention in the New
England were economic, namely, to transform these polities into sources of
revenue, markets producing useful goods and proprietary fiefdoms for favored
courtiers. Cultural, religious and military goals were inherently secondary; about
sanding away colonial institutions that inhibited economic utility and protecting
one’s investment. While arguments on the basis of justice, rights and law were
certainly put forwards by both schools of imperialists, what lay at the heart of
their difference was a different understanding of the relationship of assemblies to
the economic value of colonies to the mother country (and to their own personal
profits).
English colonization theory prescribed that colonies should serve the
economic interests of the mother country. Colonial markets ought to consume
English manufactures and produce bulk goods useful to England. Colonies were
also seen as sources of personal profit. It was not the Crown, but private
proprietary companies and individuals that sponsored most colonial voyages,
and these expected both immediate returns on their investment and to act as
permanent rulers of quasi-feudal palatinates.36 In this case, the driving factor

36

David S. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 69.
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behind the Lords of Trade’s investigations of New England politics was the
relentless lobbying campaign of Fernando Gorges and Robert Tuftson Mason,
heirs of proprietary claims to Maine & New Hampshire respectively, both
territories long since annexed and populated by Massachusetts.37 Mason &
Gorges, grandsons of the original proprietors, hoped to become proprietary lords
on the model of Maryland’s Lord Baltimore, collecting perpetual quitrents in
person or in absentia. Mason in particular held great influence on the Lords of
Trade. Edward Randolph, the Lords’ agent in Boston and their paramount source
of information, was in fact Mason’s cousin and under his patronage.38
That Randolph believed that opposition to English mercantile restrictions
and proprietary claims based upon fundamental economic differences of interest
between England and her colonies is best shown by Randolph’s long-held belief
that, whatever coercive steps might be necessary to break the grip of the Puritan
magistrates, once it was broken and Massachusetts reconstituted according to
his plan, the new government could be staffed by local people rather than
English appointees.
In Randolph’s mind, Massachusetts was not a conquered territory to be
occupied, but a loyal province held in the same republican bondage England had
suffered prior to the Restoration. Randolph showed this conception most fully in
his 1685 report to the Lords of Trade of men to be chosen for the provisional
Massachusetts government. Besides Robert Mason, now ensconced in
37
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proprietary New Hampshire, every appointee for the Council was a local, most of
his “loyal” party but some from the old “faction” to maintain their allegiance.39
While Randolph believed the governor should eventually be some prominent
Englishman to lend grandeur to the office, he had no doubt that Robert Dudley, a
local, would loyally fill the position.40 Randolph assumed an assembly of would
be part of the new government and included the number of seats each town
ought to hold based on their population.41
Randolph and the Lords of Trade believed their plan would reconcile the
rights of Englishmen as described by Halifax with the economic good of the court
and empire, satisfying both Robert Mason and the merchants of Boston, the
common people of Massachusetts and the desires of the Lords of Trade for
patronage and fees. The interests of Englishmen at home and abroad were held
to be inherently inseparable, a fact concealed only by republican distortions.
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Chapter II: Failure
How successful were Randolph and the Lords of Trade’s attempts to thus
bring Massachusetts to heel without removing their representative assemblies in
accordance with the theory of limited monarchy? In a sense, we cannot know,
because James’s ascension in imperial affairs by 1684 brought an end to any
talk of colonial assemblies and threw Randolph’s plans into disarray. However,
historians such have Richard Johnson have largely supported Randolph’s
argument that balanced colonial constitutions could reconcile colonists and
imperialists and produce an amiable, unified empire, arguing that Randolph
anticipated the amicable post-Dominion future of colonial constitutions balanced
between royal governors and elected assemblies.
After 1689 and into the eighteenth century, Johnson argues, the English
and Americans compromised, “adjusting” to each others’ demands and
producing a creative synthesis based upon official and commercial links, trade,
political norms and a shared English identity.42 Owen Stanwood reaches similar
conclusions, adding shared Protestant and racial identities to the mix.43 The
conflict of the Dominion period between English and colonists is understood to be
due to the peculiar circumstances of Puritan intransigence and James’s clumsy
absolutism, and once both were abandoned and both sides compromised by
building a balanced colonial constitution.44
However, Johnson ignores the fact that this amicable fulfillment of the ideals
42
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of Halifax and Randolph was only possible because, after 1689, English
administrators abandoned their economic demands upon the colonies, never to
revive them until the 1760s. The colonists indeed became more closely linked to
England by trade, politics and travel, but such connections were merely used to
evade the obnoxious mercantile restrictions, taxes and proprietary claims that
had caused the conflict in the first place. A lasting settlement was achieved after
1689 only because England abandoned strict enforcement of mercantile
restriction and allowed the colonists to continue to conduct their affairs
independently. The post-Dominion unity was not caused by the mutual fulfillment
of English and American economic policies, but by the Americans’ determination
to ignore English law more tactfully and England’s willingness to accept the letter
of the law.
However if the English government actually attempted to enforce imperial
mercantile policy in the colonies, as they only did in the 1680s and 1760s, the
shared nexus of Englishness, free-mindedness, limited monarchism and loyalty
to the crown that Halifax, Randolph and some historians had such faith in entirely
failed to return delegates to colonial assemblies supportive of Navigation Acts,
proprietary rights or royal taxation. This is because Randolph’s notion that only
some small, intransigent Puritan faction opposed such measures was sorely
mistaken. For while the Puritan regime of 1675 was indeed electorally
unrepresentative, their rejection of English economic restrictions and proprietary
claims was entirely representative of the views of the entire population of New
England. This is because the economic interests of virtually every New
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Englander lay in continued disobedience to the Navigation Acts and they had
nothing to gain and much to lose from the financial desires of English proprietors,
political appointees and customs officials.
A careful look at the circumstance of late seventeenth century New England
reveals that no New England government that was allowed an assembly, or
indeed even staffed by local men, could be relied upon to obey the Navigation
Acts or support English proprietary claims. The problem was, Randolph and
other observers mistakenly took a certain degree of support for the “royalization”
of government, particularly the extension of suffrage, as support for English
commercial restrictions, fees and proprietary claims.
The 1673 Navigation Acts, which mandated that colonists trade solely with
England or pay hefty fees directly contradicted New England’s economic interest
in free trade.45 New England’s prosperity stemmed primarily from lucrative
commerce with the British West Indies: “refuse fish, lumber, horses, provisions
and European goods illegally brought to the islands were exchanged for sugar,
molasses, cotton, rum, ginger, logwood, and Braziletto wood.”46 This most
important market to New England was also the one English merchants most
wanted to see New England deprived of, as rule-breaking Americans could sell
their goods cheaper in the Caribbean than law-abiding English merchants.47 New
England trade with the British Caribbean quite naturally extended into almost as
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profitable trade with the French West Indies.48 Massachusetts merchants used
the wealth gained from thus feeding the engines of plantation slavery to trade
with other colonies, getting furs, fish, lumber and whale oil from Newfoundland
and with other New England colonies and New York for food.49 Indeed,
industrious but barren Massachusetts was dependent upon such commercial
exchanges partly for wealth but partly simply to avoid starvation.50 Beyond these
foundational trade network, New England merchants extended their commerce
across the Atlantic World, to the Southern and Middle Colonies and also to
Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch colonies and even directly to Europe and Africa.
No foreseeable expansion of trade with England could compensate New
Englanders for the total severance of all these illegal commercial networks.
Randolph had inadvertently admitted as much himself in his descriptions of
the sheer scope of New England’s free trading,
Commodities, imports, trade, & c. Commodities consist chiefly of
naval stores, cattle, and provisions, which are exported to Virginia,
Jamaica, Maryland, Barbadoes, Nevis, St. Christopher's Antigua, &
c. (to which are sent "houses ready framed"), Spain, Portugal, the
Straits and England; tobacco, sugar, indigo, cotton-wool, ginger,
logwood, fustic, cocoa, and rum are imported and again
transported. They trade with most parts of Europe from which they
directly import all kinds of merchandise, so that little is left for
English merchants to import; some ships have been sent to
Guinea, Madagascar, & c., and some to Scanderoon; there are built
in the Colony 730 ships varying from 6 to 250 tons, there are 30
master shipbuilders; no notice is taken of the Navigation or
Plantation Acts.51
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The idea that New England would abandon such lucrative free trade policies, and
that some shuffling of the parts of government would produce a set of rulers with
no interest in them, was simply a fantasy. At no time before the Dominion were
the Navigation Acts obeyed, and after the Dominion fell, they were openly flouted
for the next century.
In 1701, some time after the Dominion’s fall, an anonymous American
(likely the Virginian Robert Beverley) weighed in on imperial policies towards
New England. While he denied any support for viceroyal dictatorships, he
criticized the arguments of English policymakers who believed robust New
England popular assemblies and proper enforcement of the Navigation Acts
could be reconciled.
I would not be mistaken, as if I was an Enemy to Liberty, but since
the Product of those Northern Proprieties is the same with that of
England, (the Mother Kingdom) I would gladly be informed whether
according to this Gentlemans own Principles, it is not more for the
interest of England, that the Kingdom should appoint them
Governours, who would take care that they duely observed the Acts
of Trade; then that such Power and Dominion should be given
them, as in time to make the grow prejudicial to the Interest of
England, as most certainly they will, if some better care be not
taken than hath been formerly.52
It is worth consideration that the anonymous author immediately falls into the
same problem of reconciling colonial liberties to imperial law that he accuses the
English government of. He fervently denies being an “enemy to liberty”
throughout the pamphlet and rejects “government by one man” and other “new
52
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fangled Contrivances,” but simultaneously advocates that royal governors be
empowered to enforce the Navigation Acts, which necessarily would mean
overriding the liberties of assemblies (which if they did not consist of the right to
consent to economic measures, consisted of nothing at all).53 The author’s
solution, the summoning of a council of experts to manage colonial affairs,
sounds sensible enough, but fails to resolve the intrinsic paradox.54
Finding the source of resistance of the Massachusetts government to the
Navigation Acts up to 1675 only in the machinations of a small elite of Puritan
magistrates motivated by irrational stubbornness fails to give sufficient
explanatory power to the economic struggle for New World trade that lay at the
heart of the dispute between England and Massachusetts. The belief of
Randolph and the Lords of Trade in the loyalty of a freely elected, properly
balanced Massachusetts assembly rested upon the false presumption that there
existed no such divergence of interests. In such a case, the laws of the England
were doomed to conflict with the votes of the assembly, and even the elite
opinion of the local council. Either New England obeyed the Navigation Acts, or it
did not. If it did not, then amity shared imperial identities might prevail, but if New
England was made to obey the acts, it could only be by overriding American
assemblies.
The great majority of New Englanders were equally unenthusiastic about
the proprietary claims of Mason & Gorges and those directly affected by them
were livid. Assemblymen from Maine petitioned the crown to remain under the
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jurisdiction of Massachusetts and successfully bought out Fernando Gorges’s
claim in 1680.55 Robert Mason’s lobbying campaign in the Lords of Trade, which
successfully managed to squash similar petitions from the four major town of
New Hampshire, proved more persistent and in 1683, the Lords removed New
Hampshire from the Massachusetts General Court’s jurisdiction, declaring it a
royal province in which Mason would nevertheless retain his rights to quitrents
and certain special political powers.56 A royal governor, Edward Cranfield (who
would turn out to be singularly interested in filling his own pockets, even for a
seventeenth century administrator), was sent to govern with a council and an
assembly of locals.57 According to Randolph’s theory, the residents of New
Hampshire, grateful to be relieved of the Cromwellite despotism of Boston and
able to express and grievances respectfully through their assembly, would be
loyal subjects and accept the justice of Mason’s proprietary rights.
That losing their self-government, paying quitrents to a stranger brandishing
three-generation-old deeds and being saddled with a prodigiously venal governor
did not enamor the population of New Hampshire is shown by their instant and
open hostility to Cranfield’s reign.58 To the inhabitants of New Hampshire,
contrary to Randolph’s dreams of a silent majority, the demand of Robert Mason
to extract a fortune from them by perpetual quitrents and govern them forever
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was treated as a grotesque notion both by the authorities in Boston and the
general population in New Hampshire.59
Virtually nobody in New England supported mercantile restrictions and
proprietary fiefdoms. Randolph and the Lords failed to recognize that those who
might seek to unseat the Puritan magistracy nevertheless had no interest
whatsoever in the basic aims of English intervention. Duly elected assemblies—
even if restricted merely to their proper role of assenting or rejecting legislation
and taxation rather than running the government—did not make imposing
imperial edicts any easier, but on the contrary, directly impeded successful
enforcement at every turn.
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Chapter III: King James’s “Real Empire in America”
James II’s 1685 commission for the Dominion of New England, the first
imperial policy document of his new reign, was an unambiguous declaration of
the absolute supremacy of the powers of the Crown over the rights of colonists.
In it, James proclaimed that, “the government of that Colony and Members
thereof is now in Our hands.”60 New England and the other colonies eventually
devoured by the Dominion were to be ruled by a single royal governor with the
advice of a royally appointed council.61 No mention of an assembly was included
in the document, and all rights to legislate and tax were granted to the royal
governor.62
By extinguishing colonial rights to consent to taxation and legislation by
elected assemblies and governing directly in the name of the king, James II’s
new government replaced the contradictory Whiggery of the past ten years with
an internally coherent autocracy. English and colonial observers no longer had to
rationalize how the individual right of the colonists as Englishmen to control their
own finances could be squared with the prerogative of the Lords of Trade over
those same finances.
The new Massachusetts was no longer to be modeled on Virginia, but on
the newly minted and royally governed New France of Louis XIV, a
transformation James had already tested as proprietor of New York in the 1660s,
during which Sir Edmund Andros had been his proprietary governor and as king,
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James believed he could pursue the same project through the same man on a
grander scale.63
James II’s scheme placed colonists in a logically coherent position: loyal
submission to whatever English policymakers decided. As Edmund Andros would
impoliticly state, English liberties no longer were to extend to the colonies.
English colonists no longer were to be permitted the assembly-based loyal
opposition or polite dissent that had proven in practice, to be capable of entirely
undermining English policy. Colonists, as Andros supposedly told protesting New
Hampshire residents, must choose whether to be “subjects or rebels.”
By extinguishing colonial liberties in favor of imperial policy and backing
paper with gunpowder, James II achieved what no English government had ever
before achieved since Charles II’s coronation or would ever achieve again in
New England: proper enforcement of the Navigation Acts.64 Andros’s officers
descended upon Boston and arrested any New England merchant who
disobeyed them. Successful enforcement, unsurprisingly, led to a ruinous
economic depression in Massachusetts, but, for a moment, competition with
English merchants was stopped.65
While James II did not much care about Robert Mason’s proprietary rights,
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he was determined that colonists would pay for the new royal government
themselves. Edmund Andros successfully raised poll taxes, taxes on animals and
duties on wine and other goods despite colonial outrage, decisively suppressing
open rebellions in the name of the Magna Carta and the right of Englishmen not
to be taxed without their consent.66 Andros was also commissioned to raise
money by means of quitrents, treating the colonists as his immediate tenurial
subjects.67 Andros also threw land tenure into doubt, charging colonists to have
them legally confirmed.68
Andros’s revenue policies, like his mercantile policies, were certainly
generally ruinous for colonists and brought his government into open contempt,
but they were successfully implemented despite such resistance. Andros’s
forceful actions and retinue of professional soldiers certainly overawed colonists,
but what held them in check the most was the knowledge that Andros held the
complete confidence of the king and the full might of England at his back.
The Dominion of New England was indeed overthrown by enraged
colonists, but only when Andros found himself alone on the continent after James
II’s fall. The fall of the Dominion cannot be pronounced as inevitable when it
required as extraordinary an opportunity as a Dutch invasion of England and the
flight of a sitting king without giving battle to precipitate it. Until English upheaval
left Andros vulnerable, James II’s Dominion of New England was, contrary to the
judgment of Richard Johnson, a resounding success, and successful not, as
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Viola Barnes would have it, in spite of a lack of representative institutions, but for
precisely that reason.69 Andros was able to secure Massachusetts’ obedience to
the economic policies that had eluded English imperialists since its founding and
would continue to elude them until they sought to implement them again in the
1760s. The cost of this policy was the end of colonial liberties and the burning
hatred of the entire colonial population.
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Conclusion: The Rights of Englishmen and the Supremacy of
English Legislation
Scholars often see the post-dominion moment as a time of rapprochement
between England and America, a time when the inflexibility of Puritan
republicans and Stuart absolutists gave way to political compromise. Indeed,
both the English politicians who had welcomed William & Mary’s victory over
James II and the Americans who had overthrown the Dominion believed
themselves to have engaged in a common vindication of limited monarchy theory
over absolutism. The new colonial regime in Massachusetts and almost all other
colonies would indeed be, much as Randolph had originally planned, a balance
between a royal governor and a popular elective assembly. However, the
apparent victory of limited monarchism, English liberties and common imperial
destiny was a façade that masked the fact that through his abolition of
assemblies, James II had revealed the fault line upon which England’s first
Atlantic Empire would crumble.
After the fall of the Dominion in 1689, a swathe of colonial pamphleteers
attempted to justify their revolt. Many such writers kept away from constitutional
inquiry, confining themselves to the (patently untrue) allegation that Andros had
been engaged in a conspiracy with the French and Indians to betray New
England to French rule and implement Catholicism, along with various
accusations of misrule and personal vice. Such accusations relied upon
traditional medieval justifications for overthrowing a ruler, namely the regime’s
tyranny, vice and conspiratorial plots.
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John Palmer, one of the few American defenders of the Dominion, ably
skewered many of these baseless claims, particularly demolishing the
accusations of conspiracy and casting doubt on those towards corruption.70
Palmer went beyond this to deny the existence of any inherent English rights,
proclaiming that the English Crown had absolute supremacy over colonists and
that any self-government they exercised was a privilege that might be withdrawn.
The protections guaranteed by the Magna Charta to Englishmen applied only to
Parliament and those on the mainland. Palmer declared that any attempt by
colonists to assert such right—let alone defend them by force—was an act of
rebellion the colonists must abandon “unless they are so vain to imagine
themselves capable of waging War with the Crown of England, and all its
Allies.”71
A colonial pamphlet titled the Revolution in New England Justified directly
responded to Palmer by asserting that the right of a colonist not to be taxed
except by his own representatives was inherent, individual and inviolable. Any
king who raised even “a penny of Money without an Assembly” violated the
English constitution.72 The allegiance of colonists to their king, the pamphlet
argued, was conditional upon his not taxing them without their consent in the
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form of representation in an elected assembly.73 Should a king violate this right,
he would lose his legitimacy and colonists would have the right to violently resist
his officers.74
Both the inherent right of Englishmen to assemblies and the supremacy of
the English Crown to the American colonists had been raised before. However,
as Halifax had argued in 1684, going into the eighteenth century most
Englishmen and colonists did not believe that there was any contradiction
between these two points. What these pamphlets revealed was that the two
points were, and had always been mutually contradictory. To justify the
supremacy of English mercantile acts against colonial resistance, the inviolability
of assemblies had to be nullified and to justify the inviolability of assemblies, the
supremacy English legislation had to be nullified in turn.
While the authors of The Revolution in New England Justified rejected
republicanism, professed loyalty to the new monarchs and certainly did not so
much as conceive of independence from England or a non-English identity we
can see that the struggle over colonial assemblies during the 1670s and 1680’s
had firmly laid the institutional and theoretical foundations of the American
Revolution, which were not to be budged by a century of amity.
James II’s pure autocracy had exposed for a brief moment the bankruptcy
of the imperial constitution and that logically, if English law was to run in the
American colonies, the elected assemblies must be overturned. An English
government, failing to achieve its economic imperial policies due to the
73
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resistance of colonial assemblies, had resorted to overriding and annihilating
those bodies, and in the process, inspiring passionate hatred for high-handed
English administrators among the colonial population, and eventually open revolt.
As English bureaucrats resorted to a doctrine of English supremacy over colonial
representative governments, colonists justified their right to an assembly upon a
doctrine of inherent individual rights. We have but to substitute Parliament for the
Crown and we will quickly see that James II’s 1685 abolition of assemblies was
not an anomalous footnote to history, but a sign of things to come.
While the Marquess of Halifax’s heart was certainly in what we would today
consider a better place than James II’s, it was the James, for all his arrogance,
who far more accurately grasped the nature of the relationship between colonists
and empire: that there must be either an imperial or a colonial source of laws.
Either England would have to allow the colonists to govern themselves in a state
of salutary neglect (essentially a state of independence) or England would have
to coerce the colonists into abject submission by brute force. In such a case,
colonists in turn would have to choose to surrender their power or fight for it.
Andros’s supposed statement that colonists would ultimately have to choose
between subjection and rebellion was not idle villainy but plain truth.
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The Right to Fortifications:
American Communities and the Politics of Harbor Defense: 1794-1812
I. Introduction
In April of 1806, in the midst of a debate of the House of Representatives on a bill
to expand federal funding for coastal fortifications, Josiah Quincy (F-Mass.) rose to
implore his fellow representatives to appreciate the importance fortresses held for his
constituents. Quincy began a lengthy and eloquent speech with a simple plea,
Men who have all that human nature holds dear—friends, fortunes, and
families—concentrated in one single spot on the seacoast, and that spot
exposed every moment to be plundered and desolated, will not highly
relish or prize at an extreme value the wit or levity with which this House
seems inclined to treat the dangers which threaten them, which are
sources to them of great and just apprehensions.1
Those gentlemen who treated the issue as “sport” forgot, Quincy said, that, to the
inhabitants of commercial towns, whether or not their harbor was fortified “is death.”2
Quincy concluded with an ominous warning. Should Congress continue to take hefty
revenues from the seaports, Quincy cautioned, but fail to fund their fortifications, “it took
no spirit of prophecy” to see that coastal citizens would eventually have no choice but to
choose secession over union.3
Quincy’s passionate rhetoric and dramatic threats should turn our attention to the
great value fortifications had to the populations of East Coast commercial towns and the
high priority assigned to fortifying cities by their political representatives in the first few
decades of the American republic. Quincy’s plea on behalf of his fellow townsmen,
which is one among many made in this era, also encourages us to pause long enough
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to consider the security situation from the perspective of seaport people before
adjusting our lens to see the greater national whole.
The eastern coast of the United States was virtually unfortified at the end of the
War of American Independence at a time when the international security situation was
deteriorating by the day. Just as Britain’s former colonies found the protection of the
Royal Navy lifted, the great powers of Europe descended into a series of vicious global
wars, further embroiling seas already swarming with pirates, privateers and various
opportunists. While the United States struggled to remain neutral, American ships
lacking naval protection and often lightly armed found themselves easy prey and soon
enough, violence and robbery spread even to the watery thresholds of American
harbors. During the American Revolution, many unfortified American cities had fallen to
British forces and a few had been subjected to naval bombardment and burdensome
military occupations. There was no reason to expect that should the tentacles of the
French Revolutionary Wars reach across the Atlantic, American seaports would not
suffer such fates again if left in their current state of defenselessness.
Motivated by these dangers, from 1789 to 1812 (the year in which Americans let
themselves be drawn into the maelstrom), Americans erected fortifications around many
of its large and small seaports. Some works were small, others were quite substantial.
Federal funding for these public works projects occurred in two major bursts. From 1794
to 1800, Congress allocated $620,000 on a series of forts which became known as the
“First System” and from 1808-1812, $3,000,000 on the so-called “Second System.” 4
Although the First System designated at least 20 ports, and the Second System, 50,
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much of the construction was concentrated on major ports, particularly Boston,
Philadelphia, Baltimore and above all New York City.5 Other ports that received new
defenses included Portland, Maine; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Salem, Marblehead
and Gloucester, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New London, Connecticut;
Annapolis, Maryland; Norfolk and Alexandria, Virginia; Cape Fear and Bacon Island,
North Carolina; Charleston and Georgetown, South Carolina; and Savannah and St.
Mary’s, Georgia.6 This system was integral to the defense of American cities during the
War of 1812 and many of the individual fortifications survive as historical sites to this
day. Most are not particularly famous, but the successful defense of one, Fort McHenry
(below)7, the guardian of Baltimore, is the subject of our national anthem, and its
“ramparts” are memorialized daily at sports games across the nation today.8

It is time to connect the fears to seaport safety hinted at above to the physical
structures of earth, stone and iron built between 1794 and 1812. Fortresses had to be
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designed, built, garrisoned and maintained, and all these things could be quite
expensive. As Quincy’s recognition of the fears faced by vulnerable coastal
townspeople suggests, the legislative support for such funding was inspired and
sustained by the concern of urban citizens for their lives and property.
This paper will aim to chart the actual political process by which fears and
apprehensions were translated into the great armed edifices that stand sentinel outside
American harbors to this day. Historians have discussed the basics of fortification
funding and construction and sketched the congressional arguments for and against
them. However, they have not yet investigated the important connections between
federal, state, local and popular actors in this political process. Such an inquiry is
necessary if we are to establish where the demand for fortifications originated and in
what place the power to provide them was located. The evidence regarding fort
construction, lobbying, print culture, economics and politics shows that the demand for
fortifications originated at the grassroots level and was transmitted to the politicians
through formal representation, petitions and lobbying and moreover that whenever
possible locals simply got their hands dirty and built forts themselves.
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II. Historiography
Understanding the connection between the early American republic’s eastern
cities and their fortifications is valuable first as a good example of the politics of the era:
of strong localism, vigorous community associations, and persistent conflict between the
different levels of a federated government. More broadly, a look at this subject connects
such political phenomena to military and security issues, a connection generally made
in a western rather than eastern context. Understanding that Eastern cities feared for
their safety and took measures to protect themselves corrects a tendency to create an
east-to-west geography of increasing insecurity, building instead a general portrait of a
new polity grappling with an uncertain security situation on all fronts and striving to
create new security institutions or perfect old organs in unique and new ways. Most
important, studying seaports’ relations to their forts argues in favor of a close connection
between popular will and security measures, correcting a tendency to see security
measures as foisted upon communities by higher authorities. It also addresses the
problem with disconnecting community history from security history, a tendency unwise
in a context of real and imagined modern urban fears of crime and class conflict but
positively misguided in an early modern context in which cities remained, as in
premodern times, fortified strongholds, in most of the world and most certainly on the
East Coast of the Early American Republic.
I began this paper hoping to find what role fortifications played in the great
Federalist-Republican debate over the size and character of the military, attempting to fit
fortifications into one of the competing ideological frameworks of the period. In the Early
Republic, many military technologies and systems were partly or entirely pursued out of
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political considerations regarding the size, strength and character of government. The
Democratic Republicans may have had some economic motives to support militias,
privateers, gunboats and embargoes, but a primary concern was unquestionably their
belief that such institutions would be less dangerous to liberty and representative
government than more professional alternatives. On the other side, many Federalists,
commercial interests aside, certainly believed that a professional army, navy and cadre
of officers academically trained in military science was necessary to make the United
States a respectable, honorable nation in the eyes of Europeans and to secure the
government against internal challenges to its authority.
Harbor fortifications seem to have features that would make them attractive to
either party: their inherent defensiveness would seem to render them useful to
Republicans anxious to prevent foreign adventures, while their cost and sophistication
would seem to make them attractive to Federalist supporters of a stronger, more
professional military. Unfortunately, most scholars of the era’s military debates who
might fit coastal fortifications into their arguments about the politics of coastal defense
and maritime warfare are more interested in strictly naval affairs. This is understandable
—the tale of the first years of the U.S. Navy is a dramatic one, full of gallant actions and
exotic schemes—but this focus nevertheless places fortifications in a decidedly
subordinate role. These naval histories typically lack an entry for “fortifications” in their
indexes.9 These historians are generally divided as to where fortifications fall
ideologically. For some, they are Jeffersonian, part of a quixotic plan for “passive coastal
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defense” aside gunboats and embargoes.10 According to others, fortifications were
generally desired by Federalists, the main difference lying in that Republicans favored
cheap, temporary defenses and Federalists expensive, permanent ones.11 What allows
these somewhat contradictory views of the role of fixed defenses to persist is that
fortifications are never primary to the historical arguments of these authors and are
depicted as secondary or even tertiary to either the Federalists’ or the Jeffersonians’
respective pet projects.
We might expect the historians of American fortifications themselves to provide
us an account of their politics during the first decades of the republic. However, in the
only political history of American fortifications which covers the 1789-1812 period,
Robert S. Browning’s Two if By Sea: The Development of American Coastal Policy,
while the major debates are at last sketched out, fortifications remain perched between
political factions. According to Browning, while he ascribes a slight bias in their favor to
Federalists and a slight bias against to Jeffersonians or Democratic Republicans, he
generally denies support for fortifications in Congress fell on either partisan side,
arguing that “by and large Congressmen and Senators seem to have voted on how they
judged the issue, rather than on a party or regional basis.” 12
While there is some room for representatives watching out for their constituents,
at least in the case of New York City, whose representatives “naturally” sought to protect
their commercially valuable city, Browning’s account of the 1783-1812 period is
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dominated not by a conflict between parties or congressmen but between the infant
American corps of military engineers and a “traditional mode of fortification.” In
Browning’s account, American seaport communities of the Early Republic, deeply
localist and paranoid of government tyranny, were strongly attached to a colonial
tradition of insubstantial, temporary fortifications erected under popular oversight in
times of crisis. As a consequence, throughout the early national period, like their
colonial ancestors, the inhabitants of coastal American communities were terrified of
large, permanently garrisoned masonry fortresses, and, believing them to be “refuges of
tyranny,” firmly opposed the efforts of professional engineers and the federal
government to build stronger fortresses. The members of Congress who acted in
accordance with the popular will were thus the opponents, not the supporters, of
fortifications, their support of temporary popular fortifications an impediment to the
construction of permanent ones capable of actually protecting the republic from
European navies.
Those congressmen who favored the latter type of fortifications are understood to
have done so based on their judgment, that is, as a result of their being persuaded by
the plans of the federal government and the professional engineers. Browning, while the
lone historian to take a truly political look at the fortifications of the period, is not alone in
his belief in a traditional mode of fortifications.13 If we synthesize Browning with the
naval historians who touch on fortifications in their debates, we arrive at a roughly
uniform portrait of the politics of fortification: congressional support for them being
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loosely nonpartisan, but limited by traditional American prejudices against permanent or
extensive fortifications.
Much of this picture is true, at least on the surface. Historians’ conclusion that
support for fortifications was largely nonpartisan is generally quite accurate, as is the
idea that there existed one group who supported permanent fortifications and one group
who supported temporary ones. Browning and Lewis are also correct to identify that a
traditional view of fortifications emphasizing their temporary and emergency character
existed and was promulgated by many congressmen who voted in favor of such cheap
and simple fortifications.
However, this view is incorrect in two important respects. First, its denies of the
existence of a strong regional congressional bloc in favor of fortifications of the greatest
extent and of the most durable materials made up of the representatives of American
seaports. Second, it applies prejudices in favor of temporary fortifications only to the
populations of seaport towns, who were in fact firm advocates of permanent
fortifications, rather than to the representatives of the rural hinterland, who indeed held
such cautious views.
In fact, in political arguments on fortifications, congressional and popular views
on the subject can be broken up into several components. First, there existed a hard
core of representatives affiliated by constituency, state allegiance and personal
connections to the seaports, which advocated robust federal spending on extensive,
permanent garrisoned fortifications. In the fourth through twelfth United States
Congresses, where the most important legislation on harbor defenses was brought to
the floor and debated, some of this coalition’s most vocal members included Williams
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Vans Murray (F-Md.); Theodore Sedgwick, (F-Mass.), William Lyman, (DR-Mass.),
William L. Smith (F-S.C.), (Edward Livingston (DR-N.Y.), John Swanwick, (DR-Pa.) John
Williams (DR-N.Y.), Jonathan Havens (DR-N.Y.) and Josiah Quincy (F-Mass.), to name
some of the loudest in the major debates. This faction, which was made up rather
indiscriminately of members of both the Federalist and Democratic Republican parties
from 1794-1812, stated directly in their speeches that they specifically represented
commercial cities and their way of life, as opposed to the newly settled West and the old
South. Each frequently brought up the great ports of their respective states in speeches
and legislation.
The rest of the congressmen, who fell into the category of representatives of
states which, whether coastal or rural, lacked major seaports and whose opinions on
fortifications varied wildly. If anyone can be said to have held the “traditional” prejudice
against strong fortifications, it was many members of this group, but they differed in
degree from those who at least supported cheap and temporary emergency
fortifications and those who opposed all federal funding of seacoast defenses. Members
of this group fell into a variety of categories and their remedies often shifted, and indeed
many voted on opinion and judgment as much as regional or partisan loyalty. What
distinguished this group from the fortifications advocates is that they lacked strong
connections to seaport inhabitants who aggressively pushed for harbor defenses. The
basic issue is that non-seaport representatives would generally support smaller
allocations for less permanent fortifications but oppose grander schemes.14
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The views of Rep. Albert Gallatin (DR-Pa.), a major Jeffersonian leader, illustrate
the perspective of non-seaport representatives best. Gallatin voted in favor of $75,000
appropriation towards harbor fortifications in June, 1797, (which passed 48 to 38 in the
House) but opposed larger amounts. Gallatin argued that a “general plan of
fortifications” was “just and proper” but that it ought only to be a “temporary provision
against danger.”15 Gallatin hoped that “no more should be appropriated than was
absolutely necessary” and argued for closely timing the level of appropriations to the
tenor of European conflict, rather than simply expending a great sum on defense as a
precaution regardless, as seaport representatives sought to do.16 Gallatin was firmly in
favor of states ceding the land the new forts occupied to the federal government (thus
maintaining congressional oversight over scope and cost.17 Representatives like
Gallatin often claimed that they judged fortifications to be unnecessary and ineffective
based on personal judgment, but they were only free to do so because they
overwhelmingly lacked connections to seaports and the interests of their constituents
were in no way tied to them.18 In their positive dislike for permanence, interest in
controlling costs and belief that fortifications should be for emergency use only, many
non-seaport representatives certainly fit Browning’s definition of “traditionalists.”
Historians have not recognized the hard core of support for permanent
fortifications because they have lumped all supporters of all fortification bills together,
including with seaport representatives the more sympathetic non-seaport (mostly rural)
15
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representatives hinted at above and concluding that all supporters uniformly favored
temporary fortifications. However, support for permanence lay with a hard core of
seaport representatives who kept the fortification issue alive between crises capable of
motivating larger coalitions in favor of greater spending, and led such coalitions during
such opportunities. The seaport representatives in the House and their state level
counterparts have not yet been connected to substantial grassroots lobbying and to the
continuance of traditional popular participation in fortification construction. While seaport
representatives might appeal to ideology, notions of general national defense and the
financial worth of cities to appeal to the rest of the nation, the core of their support was
provided not by ideological fidelity but by connections to their constituents and their
interests.
Indeed, what most strongly demonstrates the conclusion that support for
fortifications was connected to popular demand for security rather than some ideological
doctrine is the fact that early republican seaport citizens used widely variable political
avenues to get what they wanted, each with multiple implications for government
strength and centralization. In Congress, they supported a stronger executive and
federal programs for fortifications, but in state legislatures, when they believed the
federal funding was inadequate, fortification advocates pursued state-funded, stateowned fortifications and justified their actions with states rights doctrines and threats of
secession on the floor of congress. Meanwhile, citizens of various means turned to
direct democracy, volunteering to fortify with their own hands, shovels and individual
donations, whether this meant working on forts built by the federal government, by a
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state or organized by grassroots assemblies.19 The plethora of disparate political roads
pursued by the advocates of fortifications makes it impossible to connect them to only a
federally centralized, states rights or directly democratic political model or ideology. The
use of decentralized or centralized rhetoric was always in service to the primary
objective of protecting individual communities from danger.
Historians have not characterized seaport communities as I have, as vanguards
of fortification support, but as I have mentioned, instead depicted seaports as part of a
“traditional” anti-permanence ideology. The belief that conflict between modernizing
engineers and traditionalist communities characterized the 1794-1812 period is based
on focusing on the perspective of engineers rather than communities. In general, many
fortifications specialists are less interested in the 1794-1812 period, in which civilians
meddled a great deal with fortifications, than the 1816-1861 period, in which military
engineers wrested control of fortifications from the hands of legislators and communities
while securing vastly larger budgets and more or less dictating national defense policy.20
The 1816-1861 period is unapologetically known as the “Golden Age of Fortifications”
by fortification historians engineers, an age when the link between the dreams of the
American engineer and the design of his creations was supreme.21 Nevertheless, I
believe the haste to leave this time of messy civilian interventions has obscured the
basic dynamics of the 1794-1812 period.
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In fact, the evidence (such as newspapers rarely used by fortification historians)
shows that the will and the resources of each American seaport were chief signifiers
behind the character and strength of their respective defenses. The localism and strong
political consciousness of the period led inhabitants to aggressively intervene in favor of
precisely the fortifications that they wanted with whatever resources they possessed. In
the case of small coastal towns with commercially minor harbors, small, temporary
fortifications were indeed produced, but less because the inhabitants desired them in
preference to larger, more permanent ones than because inhabitants lacked the
resources in labor, capital or political connections to acquire anything bigger or better,
even if they supportively volunteered what they had. Where inhabitants had more
resources, they funneled them into stronger fortifications. Most noticeably, New York
City, the richest and second most populous city in the United States deployed its large,
skilled population, its extensive financial reserves and its stranglehold on the state
legislature in Albany to aggressively pursue a system of fortifications that was
impressive not only by American standards, but was indeed one the most impregnable
in the entire world. (Castle Williams shortly after the War of 1812, next page)22.
Separating the political means used to get fortifications and their various
ideological baggage from the core source of support is important because it allows us to
get to the core of how representative government functions, that is, to measure the
means by which the desires of constituents are supposed to be translated into political
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action by their representatives and then judge the degree to which such mechanisms
succeed in doing so and what factors complicate or prevent such a linkage. Seaport
inhabitants petitioned, lobbied and elected federal and state representatives, and
contributed to the work of fortification itself on an immediate popular level. The very
single-mindedness of individual communities’ desires to deploy their political, economic
and personal resources to see fortifications built led to a wide and flexible array of
strategies which produced a surprising amount of political friction, both in terms of
debates within specific organs of government and between them. In Congress, seaport
representatives fought to secure federal funding both for general systematic programs
and their own specific projects, in many cases running into conflict not only with
unenthusiastic inlanders but also with each other, bickering over the relatively small pool
52

of funding. State governments, unsatisfied with federal funding pushed for defenses
independently, running into conflict with Congress over whether new forts were to be
under state or federal jurisdiction. Even metropolitan governments and local popular
assemblies could generate conflict with other sources of authority, as could citizens’
decisions whether or not to volunteer for fortification construction labor. Running behind
the chaotic surface produced by all of these efforts was a consistent and
understandable desire for protection common to rich and poor alike, although each used
potentially different strategies and resources to accomplish their shared objective.
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III. Wealthy Cities, Deadly Seas
Josiah Quincy (F, Mass.) was only one of many congressmen who vigorously
defended the interests of coastal commercial cities in the Early Republic, but he was
certainly one of the most eloquent. According to Quincy, his own votes in favor of
fortifications were motivated by the fears of his constituents of dangers to themselves,
their political freedoms and their property, which they believed only fortification could
protect them against. As Quincy rhetorically asked Congress in 1806,
With respect to the general utility of fortifications, I ask by whom is it
denied? by men interested in that species of defence? by the inhabitants
of cities? by those, the necessity of whose situations has turned their
attention to the nature of fortifications and their efficacy? No sir, these men
solicit them. They are anxious for nothing so much. they tell you the safety
of all they hold dear, their wives, their children, their fortunes and lives, are
staked on your decision. They do not so much ask for fortifications as a
favor; they claim them as a right; they demand them.23
Quincy shredded the argument that those who opposed fortifications did so based on
individual judgment: only “western men” he said, ignorant of the dangers faced by
coastal cities, would deny the utility of fortresses.24 According to Quincy, the strength
and universality of the demand for fortifications from the citizen of coastal cities had a
direct relation to the size and scope of the dangers they faced.
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were a profitable and also
dangerous period for the citizens of American commercial cities. Both the profit and the
danger were strongly related to the French revolutionary war, the rigors of which
rendered European belligerents desperate for goods neutral Americans were eager to
provide while also opening the markets of distracted empires to American penetration.
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The ranks of American seamen swelled and the population of American cities and the
economy of the entire nation boomed. However, the United States had no navy to speak
of and American merchantmen were vulnerable to the armadas of cruisers crisscrossing
war-torn European domestic and imperial waters and were incapable of avenging
seizure in European ports.
For all the romance associated with the age of fighting sail then and now,
eighteenth century maritime warfare was a thoroughly mercenary affair in which the lure
of profit, whether labeled as plunder, booty or prize money, was a prime motivator to
everyone onboard from captain to common sailor. Ashore, private shipowners and
admiralty courts profited, while politicians and admirals more disinterestedly viewed
blockades and commerce raiding as military strategies to bring enemy nations to their
economic knees.
In the first decades of the republic, American merchant vessels found themselves
seized, harassed and extorted by a wide range of pirates, privateers and warships
everywhere they went. American ships were ruthlessly targeted by the Muslim corsair
states of North Africa, who menaced not only the Mediterranean but the Atlantic after a
vengeful Great Britain allowed them passage through the straits of Gibraltar. An
opportunistic Napoleon allowed French vessels to plunder American ships at will
regardless of his official diplomatic position towards the United States. Great Britain
famously raided American merchantmen for manpower, recovering the numerous
deserters fleeing the hellish conditions of the Royal Navy while also kidnapping
numerous American citizens.25
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The various responses of the United States to “outrages” at sea against
American merchantmen have been well covered by historians.26 The Federalist solution
was the construction of a permanent and professional American navy, and indeed an
American squadron of 44-gun heavy frigates was constructed and deployed by both
Federalist and Democratic Republican administrations against the North Africans,
French and British. The Democratic Republicans, rejecting further Federalist demands
for a larger navy of 74-gun battleships, advocated two famously and spectacularly
misguided methods to protect commerce: embargoes against offending nations, (which
failed to produce results) and flotillas of shallow-draft one-or-two cannon gunboats to at
least protect the coasting trade and harbors, (which were easily overmatched by frigates
or battleships.)
However, the threats against merchantmen on the high seas and the various
measures taken to protect them are only one half of the period’s story of maritime
security and defense. Seaport inhabitants were afraid, not only of the dangers they
faced abroad on their ships, but also those menacing them in their homes, taverns and
churches ashore. While historians of the period’s fortifications have implicitly
acknowledged such fears by describing the defenses built to guard cities, they have not
interrogated the specific fears of urban citizens, an important factor if we are to consider
the character of degree of community support for fortifications, just as it is important to
understand the exact nature of piracy, privateering and impressment to understand the
genesis of the United States Navy and the attempted Jeffersonian embargoes.
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The inhabitants of American seaports feared that just as the defenselessness of
their merchantmen exposed them to brigandage at sea, the defenselessness of their
harbors would expose them to pillage and extortion at home. Urban citizens certainly
feared that their vulnerability at the shoreline exposed them to foreign conquest and all
the bodily hazards of war and the political humiliations of conquest. Above all, the
threats to their homes, possessions, investments, bank accounts, warehouses and
businesses, that is, to all the fruits accumulated by their foreign commerce and
domestic industry, loomed large in the minds of townspeople. Specifically, urbanites
worried that hostile armed ships might enter their harbors and destroy, seize or extort
the great collection of fixed and moveable capital cities represented.
Congressman Josiah Quincy’s 1806 speech on the importance of fortifications to
seaport inhabitants provides a useful metaphor for the relation between maritime
commerce and the accumulated wealth of cities and the way in which seaport
inhabitants conceived of warships and fortifications to respectively defend each of them,
in the words of one of the foremost representatives of maritime interests. In 1806, while
preaching against “an offensive war with England” Rep. John Randolph, (DR-Va.) a
leading Democratic-Republican leader of Southern planters, famously rejected any
defense of American commerce at sea by comparing the United States to a great
“mammoth, which ought to cleave to the land, and not wade out into the ocean to fight
the shark.”27 The shark of course, was Great Britain, which by 1806 was sole naval
superpower, having smashed the combined navies of France and Spain at the Battle of
Trafalgar in 1805. Randolph rejected the legitimacy of maritime commerce and thus
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denied that eastern seaports had any claims upon the union for the defense of such
enterprises.
Josiah Quincy responded to Randolph by conceding that even if rural
representatives refused to protect maritime commerce with federal warships, they were
nevertheless obligated to fortify American seaports. Quincy took Randolph’s metaphor
and expanded it, arguing that while the Southern states might be a mammoth whose
domain was the land, the active and industrious people of the seaports were best
represented by a far-ranging fish. Quincy compared the United States to an alliance
between the mammoth and cod in which the fish, “enterprising, active, and skillful,
spreads himself over every ocean, and brings back the tribute of all climes to the feet of
the mammoth,” who benefitted by being able to “stretch his fat sides along his tobacco
plantations, without paying the tithe of a hair… In such a case,” Quincy argued, ought
the
…mammoth, because by mere beef and bone he outweighs the cod in the
political scale, to refuse a portion of that revenue, which the industry of the
cod annually produces, to defend him in his natural element; if not against
the great leviathan of the deep, at least against the petty pikes which
prowl the ocean; and if not, in the whole course of his adventurous
progress, at least in his native bays and harbors, where his hopes and
wealth are deposited, and where his species congregate?28
By this metaphor Quincy made two arguments, each of which he then laid out in less
whimsical terms. First, he argued that the basic function of fortifications was to provide a
haven for a commercial, maritime people and the products of their labor. Second, that
providing such a haven to urban inhabitants and their wealth was important because
urban industry and commerce directly benefitted the rest of the nation.
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These points led Quincy towards his main conclusion that the sheer amount of
wealth concentrated in exposed American seacoast cities rendered them
disproportionately important parts of the nation and thus entitled them to expensive
protection in the form of permanent harbor fortifications. “Every class and collection of
citizens” Quincy argued, “have a right to claim from Government that species of
protection which their situation requires, in proportion to their exposure, and to the
greatness of the stake in which society has in their safety.”29
Quincy invited the Westerners to consider not only the disproportionately high tax
revenue drawn from cities, but also, “the great portion of the active and fixed capital of
society which they contain.”30 For example, Quincy argued, if all of the value contained
in the import duties, export duties, banks, stocks, shipping and personal property in the
city of New York alone were to be added up, it would comprise “one hundred millions of
the active capital of the nation!”
Indeed, we can only appreciate fears of seaport inhabitants if we understand just
how much wealth was currently lying unguarded within urban limits. During the period
from 1794-1812, the United States had approximately a dozen seaports worthy of the
name and a few ports of truly global economic importance. In 1800, cities were
approximately 6% of the total U.S. population of 5,308,483. 31 In 1800, the New York City
contained 60,515 people; Philadelphia, 41,220; Baltimore, 26,514; Boston, 24,937; and
Charleston, 18,824.32 Below this tier were almost twenty smaller seaports ranged along
the coast from Maine to Georgia each containing between 4,000 and 10,000 inhabitants
29
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in 1800.33 Figures all these cities are taken midway along a population boom that would
see the population of many of these cities double and even triple from 1790 to 1810.34
The rapid population expansion of American cities was closely related to the boom in
American maritime commerce.
In the first few decades of the United States, a vast proportion of the total
national wealth was concentrated in the cities of the East Coast. Eastern cities such as
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and a host of smaller towns were centers of
production and trade. American merchantmen transported the goods of the American
hinterland like lumber, tobacco and cotton in American ships to foreign lands and
returned with the products of Europe, Asia and Africa. Such prosperity benefitted some
more than others. The shipping industry employed thousands, although a common
sailor or dockworker’s life was a rough one. It also employed a variety of artisans to
produce the specialized parts of eighteenth century ships. At the top, merchants and
shipowners were kept wealthy, able to purchase handsome houses or retire to the
country and style themselves as gentlemen. Over the course of the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century, traditional maritime industry was joined in seaport towns by
industrial production of goods, creating an industrial working class and a white collar
business class.
According to Josiah Quincy, to protect this mass of property and the industrious
souls who produced it by “mere insurance office arithmetic” even “five millions” spent on
fortification (a sum exponentially higher than the $150,000 currently debated on the
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floor) would represent only five percent interest.35 Quincy’s object, he told Congress,
was
…to call gentlemen to consider what is the market worth of security, and
that they may not deem the moneys they apply to these objects, as they
seem willing to deem them, absolutely thrown away. This great mass of
the national wealth, thus concentrated on the banks of one of the most
exposed harbors in the world, is liable to the insult and depredation of the
most despicable force.”36
Quincy and his fellow seaport congressmen drew a direct connection between the
wealth of the coastal cities and their need for protection. In 1807, Rep. Orchard Cook
(DR-Mass.) succinctly summed up the connection between wealth and fortifications in
the simplest terms.
Thus we might say, what costs most labor is most valuable; cities cost
most labor, therefore cities are most valuable. What is most valuable is
most worthy of defense. Cities are most valuable, therefore are cities most
worthy of defence. … Shall we not act unwisely in the extreme if we lose
our treasure, permit our strong boxes to be rifled, the emporiums of our
wealth invaded, by withholding the rival expense of a lock? 37
Essentially, Quincy and his fellow representatives argued to the House that while the
cities might be electorally insignificant compared to the countryside (in 1800, cities
comprised approximately only 6% of the U.S. population), they had an outsize value to
the economy of the countryside by whit of connecting the rural areas to international
markets and by being sources of production themselves and that, as a consequence,
deserved special protection. While urban citizens were certainly no more patriotic or
republican than rural citizens, their outsize industriousness and wealth nevertheless
entitled them to extra consideration. If American seaports were entitled to special
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protection to safeguard their wealth, what sort of dangers was that wealth, and the
communities themselves specifically exposed to?
Urban anxieties were strongly concentrated upon the fear of the violation of
seaport harbors by hostile warships. Should even a single hostile ship enter an
unprotected harbor, it would be in a position to at the very least seize docked American
merchant ships and at worst reduce the entire city to ashes by bombardment. A hostile
ship could also use the threat of such bombardment to force the city’s surrender,
bringing about occupation, confiscation and potentially wholesale pillage.
However, seaport inhabitants were less worried that enemies would force them to
surrender their allegiance to the United States or their self-government than a few
warships would simply extort massive sums from urban coffers and then leave. The
specific fear that a couple of European battleships or some even weaker force would as
they put it, “lay them under contribution” occurs again and again in congressional
debates, urban newspapers and military documents. In the words of Rep. William Ely
(F-Mass.),
Defenceless nations invite aggression. We are wealthy. If two ships of war
can come and take three or four millions from the banks of New York, it
would be found very convenient to the ways and means of any nation.38
Seaport newspapers refer frequently to memories of the War of Independence and the
losses suffered by poorly or unfortified seaports. Representative John Williams, (DR,
NY) reminded Congress that, “during the war… one third of the city of New York was
burnt by the enemy,” not to mention much of the rest of the state devastated or
occupied.39
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These fears were very legitimate in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century in which the seas swarmed with privateers and pirates, European navies
grappled for supremacy even in the Caribbean and British frigates lay outside American
harbors to search for deserters and impress American sailors. Both Presidents Adams
and Jefferson called Congress’s attention that the general danger in the seas had
reached the coast. Even as late as 1806, Rep. Dawson (DR-Va.) referred to Thomas
Jefferson’s address to Congress,
Our coasts have been infested, and our harbors watched, by private
armed vessels, some of them without commissions, some with illegal
commissions, others, with those of legal form, but committing piratical acts
beyond the authority of their commissions. They have captured in the very
entrance of our harbors, as well as on the high seas, not only the vessels
of our friends coming to trade with us, but our own also.40
Dawson argued that the warning of the president was joined by that of the people,
“Already have our constituents expressed their sentiments, daily do our fellow citizens
convey to us declarations of their indignation.”41
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IV. Popular Participation
Direct popular participation in fortification demonstrates most clearly the
connection between individual communities and their harbor defenses. As the
professional, and initially mostly European engineers commissioned by the War
Department spread out across the East Coast of the new United States to examine and
fortify seaports, they were met by towns whose assemblies, vigilance committees,
guilds, local patrons and militias were animated by a strong desire to secure
fortifications.42 For seaport citizens, simply picking up shovels and heading to the
construction site was the simplest means of acquiring a fortification.
New York’s newspapers provide an excellent look into the way volunteer
fortification labor was organized and how it was closely associated with a general
interest in fortifications. In 1794 as engineer Charles Vincent determined to build a
string of forts across the islands in New York harbor, the city’s various guilds, clubs and
associations spontaneously turned out to provide free labor. A sample notice was that of
the Journeymen Hatters,
THE Journeymen Hatters of this City, who may be incline to assist at the
public works, now going forward at Governor’s Island, are requested to
attend a meeting, on Monday Evening, at 7, o’clock, at the house of Mr.
Bush.43
Organizations which provided volunteer labor in New York included the Grocers,
Coopers, Schoolmasters, Bakers, Cartmen, Journeymen Cabinet Makers and the
General Society of Merchants and Tradesmen. More elite professions did not excuse
themselves, and the Lawyers posted a notice identical to those of the tradesmen
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promising to provide manual labor. Ethnic and
national societies like the English Republicans, the
Republican Irishmen and the German Society also
volunteered. In Baltimore, labor was even organized
generationally: “A Youth” asked his fellow “Young
Gentlemen of Baltimore” to emulate their elders
currently volunteering on the fortifications by
gathering at a set time to volunteer as a group. 44
One thing that immediately becomes clear in
these notices is that the seaport volunteer laborers
did not believe they were building “refuges of
tyranny” but instead characterized their labor as a
patriotic effort without reservations even in places
where they were building elaborate masonry works.
As the The Tammany Society/Columbian Order (the
newborn Tammany Hall), proudly proclaimed in its
notice to work on New York’s extensive defenses,
“This being a voluntary act, it is presumed that none
who are well-wishers to the safety and security of
this country, will neglect to attend.” 45
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Seaport inhabitants asserted that fortifications
were fully compatible with, and even integral to,
republicanism, in that they could give republican
citizens a better ability to defend their lives, families
and property against predatory monarchies. An oftreprinted (and thus often used) “fortification song”
written for volunteer fortress laborers to sing in the
1794 New York Diary is worth reproducing in full (at
left).46
Congressional representatives echoed their
constituents’ proud statements about “walls of
defiance by citizens built” and elaborated on the
importance of fortifications to republics with classical
references to republican city defense. In the words of
Rep. Orchard Cook (DR-Mass.), in arguing in favor of
defending cities with fortifications rather than
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retreating to the hinterland for guerrilla warfare,
Indeed sir, with the ancients, the city was the sine qua non of national
existence. When Troy fell we hear no more of the Trojans and the
Carthaginians lost their name under the ruins of their city. In those days
each city was defended as a Thermopylæ. Modern tactics support a
doctrine equally brave and politic… Mr. Chariman, If the slaves of a
despot, or the subjects of a king, compelled to fight for rights not their own;
if they defend the abattis of their forts and bravely meet their foes at the
parapet, shall we less valorously protect our dwellings, our property, our
families, and our holy and sacred right of self-government?47
Cook concluded that fortifications had just as much value to modern republics as
ancient ones, arguing that “To a country defended by militia, fortifications are
indispensable. I ask sir, of military men who served in our Revolutionary war, could we
without fortifications, now so decried, have succeeded in that war.”48
According to some sources, patriotic relations to fortifications was so important
as to be above party. One New York editorial had to say of the “spirit and unanimity” of
the “voluntary services performed on the fortification” that “the zeal of all [original
emphasis] parties in this business proves, that however men may differ on speculative
points, or certain measures of government of little performance, yet all men agree to put
the country in a posture of defense.”49
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So much was “the public attention turned to Fortification” that the American
Minerva published a glossary of technical military engineering terms for layman readers,
THE terms of Fortification, continually occurring in the interesting accounts
of the belligerent powers in Europe and the West indies, and the spirit
which animates every class of our citizens, voluntarily uniting to forward
the works on Governors Island, in defence of this harbor, being at present
the leading topic of conversation in almost every company—the following
explanation will we have no doubt be acceptable to our readers, as they
tend to give a more clear conception of the principle means used both in
defensive and offensive tactics. 50
Among readers of the American Minerva at the very least, it is fair to assume knowledge
of the correct definition of the terms glacis, covered way, fosse, scarp, counterscarp,
rampart, curtain, bastions, parapet, embrasures, outer guards, citadel followed by a
definition of the terminology of siege warfare, such as counter guards, counter
approaches, palisades, fascines and mines. Knowledge of fortification was also
considered part of a good “republican education” as modeled upon accounts of how
freshly-minted French republican citizens were being educated.
In most seaports, labor was organized by local societies, militias and town
assemblies and people manifested patriotic enthusiasm to build defenses for their
homes and businesses. But, the smaller seaport communities, however zealous, only
had the resources for small forts and some of them had ideas that conflicted with
professionals. It is here that Browning and Lewis’s thesis of a traditional style is most
persuasive. However, behind all these actions lay the desire of an individual community
for what it perceived to be the best defenses possible.
The inhabitants of Wilmington, Delaware, for example, disliked the spot Engineer
Pierre L’Enfant (the planner of the new Federal City) had chosen, which was rather
50
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swampy, and consequently refused (through the mouthpiece of the state’s governor) to
provide the customary volunteer labor unless L’Enfant built it in a spot less “difficult to
reinforce with militia in case of an alarm or emergency.” In this case, the Wilmingtonians
indeed referenced a traditional use of forts as rallying points for the militia, a use that
the American Vincent took into account in his defense of New York, but that the
European L’Enfant found infuriatingly counterproductive. Arguing that that the
Wilmingtonians’ site failed to command the entire river, L’Enfant vented his frustration on
the traditional fortification mode of local control and volunteer labor,
You speak from a computation of the difference of a free labor, which you
say the inhabitants are willing to perform, provided the work is erected
where they wish it to be, meaning apparently by this, that their assistance
cannot be expected where I propose. I must observe this would have but
little weight with me, because the works intended to have a permanent
object, would better be constructed by proper workmen carrying it on
gradually, than to have recourse to those expedients of mustering the
citizens at large, which may do well at a moment of immediate necessity;
when circumstances may require those works to be made complete.51
L’Enfant observed tartly that a fort on the site the townsfolk wanted would be useful only
for “a salute, and to afford an afternoon diversion to the inhabitants of the town.”52
Focusing on this conflict should not blind us to the fact that its cause was not
opposition to fortifications but differing opinions on their best use. While, it is fair to say
that Browning’s judgment that the participation of inhabitants like the Wilmingtonites
could be an obstacle to the efforts of military engineers and that their views did not align
with the plans for powerful, permanent works, these historians mistakenly extend this
judgment, fair with regard to small provincial towns, to the republic’s great seaports: to
places like Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia and above all New York. In these places, an
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identical commitment to voluntary labor and local participation can be found, but one far
more congenial to engineers and their plans for extensive permanent works. J.J.U.
Rivardi, one of the First System engineers, found an excellent reception in Baltimore,
writing, “In general, it seems that the citizens are disposed to give every possible
assistance; so I hope the whole plan will be executed for the sum allowed by the
[Federal] Government.”53 Rivardi expressed a wish that there were more Americans with
engineering expertise, but expressed satisfaction with the efforts of the Baltimore militia,
local consultants, officers and a volunteer artillery company.54 Rivardi’s opinion had not
changed when he left Baltimore for the smaller Virginian ports around Hampton Roads,
“In Baltimore, I found the situation so advantageous, the soil so proper for fortification
and the zeal of the inhabitants so favorable to my purpose, that, after having given the
necessary plans, I left the place with strong hopes that the works should be executed
for the sums allowed by Government for that purpose.”55
In the provincial Hampton Roads area of Virginia, the same zeal that had been
so useful to Rivardi in Baltimore suddenly became both insufficient and an obstacle, for
interesting reasons. Zeal was insufficient because both towns lacked the population or
skills to supply him with sufficient labor.
Most interesting however, the attachment of a community to its fortifications
became an obstacle because individual communities prioritized their individual defense
over the greater good of the region. When Rivardi arrived, Portsmouth and Norfolk
began to argue with each other over which town should be fortified, the men of both
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towns proclaiming they would only work on their own forts.56 While one party did claim
to despise all fortifications, preaching the merits of guerilla-style “bush” warfare,57 the
problem was not so much that localism led inhabitants to prefer temporary to permanent
fortifications, but that localism led them to prefer their own over that of others.
If we compare Baltimore and Hampton Roads, the difference between popular
participation in large and small cities makes sense, particularly if we consider the
function of forts and the importance of property. A large city like New York or Baltimore
possessed not so much superior zeal (the inhabitants of Wilmington, Norfolk and
Portsmouth were all zealous about what they perceived to be the best way of fortifying
their particular respective towns) but superior resources, meaning that they had more to
draw on to fortify and also more to protect. Both factors drew them to demand bigger
and better fortifications.
While most inhabitants of seaport towns were deeply interested in their own
fortifications, the great commercial cities differed from their smaller cousins in that they
specifically and consistently sought not temporary, traditional fortifications but massive,
permanent and garrisoned fortifications. They certainly helped with these fortifications
through local participatory methods like volunteer labor, but projects of such a scale
required the resources of governments, and as they met federal engineers with the
expertise in fortification that Americans had for centuries lacked as colonials, the
numerous and sometimes quite wealthy citizens of seaport towns aggressively moved
to make their representatives seize the day and supply their respective engineers with
the resources to build them the largest and most modern ramparts available.
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V. Representation, Lobbying and Legislative Action
While many speeches were given in favor of fortifications, Josiah Quincy’s April
15, 1806 speech to the House of Representatives was one was one of the most
eloquent, and its reception, not only in Congress, but by the people of American cities,
reveals the impossibility of separating the actions of congressmen from the fears of their
representatives. The May 13, 1806 edition of The Balance, and Columbian Repository,
a New York newspaper, was one of many newspapers that considered that speech
worthy of reprinting in its entirety, and did so with the following introduction, begging
leave to call
…serious attention to the following Speech of Mr. Quincy, of
Massachusetts. We ask democrats to divest themselves for a moment of
party-prejudice, and read it. We desire, that they may remember, at every
line, that John Pierce, an American citizen, was killed in the entrance of
the harbor of New-York, within a quarter of a mile of the shore, while
navigating a coasting sloop, by a paltry British force, in no respect superior
to three of our frigates.
Quincy’s speech was printed in its entirety in Philadelphia, Boston, Newburyport,
Charleston, New Haven and Northampton as well, each time alone under the specific
heading “Quincy’s Speech.”58 The speech was used by both sides in pamphleteering
debates on fortifications. Western-sympathetic authors opposed to harbor fort spending
attempted to poke holes in his argument that Congress owed the east its fortifications
because it had already spent millions on western land purchases and expansion,59 while
urban supporters extensively quoted “the eloquent Quincy” to oppose such “quibbling
nonsense.”60
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Seaport inhabitants were not ignorant of congressional debates on fortifications,
and indeed watched them so closely that they could even, though living in one of the
most bitterly partisan periods of American history in the interest of security “divest
themselves for a moment of party-prejudice.” Well-informed urban citizens sought to
keep firm control of their representatives at both the state and federal level, lobbying
and petitioning them aggressively while making election choices with security in mind.
The most complete illustration of the strong relationship between seaport
inhabitants and their legislators is shown by New York City’s relentless two-decade
campaign to secure the city’s harbor with an extensive, permanent system of masonry
fortresses. In many American seaports, particularly the largest, inhabitants quickly
realized that the funds allocated by Congress were inadequate to substantial
fortifications and began to petition state legislatures to supply additional money. As a
New London newspaper argued, after describing the voluntary work of various parties of
citizens on the fortifications, that the current Federal funds were “very insufficient” to
fortify the port, and that therefore, the state legislature should add its own substantial
funding.61
In 1794, New Yorkers aggressively pressed the state government in Albany to
provide such funding. When a fortification bill was raised and voted down in the state
legislature, New York City erupted in outrage. Confusion immediately ensued, with one
newspaper report stating representatives had failed to pass the bill generating uproar in
the city while other reporters, who claimed that the bill had been passed (and it was, but
only after being turned down several times) frantically assuring them their
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representatives had done their jobs.62 On March 24, 1794, the New York state
legislature received letters and a petition from New York City. The letters, “from
gentleman of that city” urged “in the strongest and most pressing manner, that a sum of
money sufficient for that purpose be granted for the immediate fortification of New-York,
&c” while the petition, “from a number of the inhabitants of the said city” concurred.63
The editorial said that fortunately the congressmen had already passed the bill when
they received the petition.
“A Citizen” reflected on what he believed had happened: the fortification bill
would never have passed, he argued “had it not been for the clamors and determination
of the citizens ton the occasion” and the city would “have been left exposed … to the
invasion even of an Algernine cruiser” For this reason, “A Citizen” argued, New Yorkers
should remember which “names on those tickets” in the upcoming state election had “no
claim to the suffrages of the citizens” and they should vote accordingly to secure a
legislature willing to maintain the defenses of the city harbor and of the state generally.64
What exactly happened in Albany is irrelevant: what is clear is the demand of New York
City for fortifications and the desperation of the legislature to avoid appearing to reject
their request.
In the 1790s, the New York state government, clearly attentive to the interests of
Manhattan, began to pour funding into the harbor fortifications under construction,
allowing engineers originally appointed by the federal government to attempt ambitious,
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permanent fortresses they could never have attempted with the much smaller federal
funds.
It was only a matter of time before Congress discovered that New York had vastly
exceeded its purview. William Lyman, the head of the committee on fortifications,
reported to the House of Representatives on May 9, 1796, unlike in the rest of the
country, at New York, “works have been laid out upon a plan very extensive, constructed
with durable materials, and principally under the direction of the Government, and at the
expense of, that State.” Lyman, a pro-fortifications representative from Massachusetts,
recommended that Congress support New York with an additional appropriation of
federal funds, generating fierce debate in the House. 65
The congressional fight which ensued revealed that many states were willing to
push hard against Federal power to fortify their harbors. Rural representatives quickly
argued that if New York wanted more federal money, it should cede the land their forts
were built on to the Federal Government and thus turn over control of construction from
the state to the federal government. Representatives from New York, Massachusetts,
South Carolina, Pennsylvania and others argued that they would not cede fortress land
to the federal government because their constituents feared that Congress would fail to
fund security, so they would be better off simply keeping control of the land, manning
the ports with state troops and building them with their own resources. The seaport
states continued, however, to demand federal funds anyway, claiming that it was only
the negligence of congress that had forced such a drastic states-rights strategy. This
issue produced a lengthy and convoluted debate over the issue of sessions and
funding.
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The takeaway, however, was that seaports were generally willing to pursue every
available political avenue to secure as much funds for as permanent fortifications as
possible. New York’s claim that it had already spent $200,000 on its forts, which would
nevertheless be useless if federal funds did not complete them, aroused the anger of
rural representatives who felt as if they were being blackmailed. Rep. Henry Dearborn,
(DR-Md.) one of the lone seaport representatives to oppose permanent fortifications
(out of military opinions), criticized the seaports for their independent initiative. “The
State of New York,” Dearborn accused, “could not have contemplated more extensive
works if we had actually been engaged in war.” Dearborn extended his accusation that
states were pursuing overly strong and permanent fortifications to other large seaports,
“At Charleston, it seemed as if it were the intention to erect works, not only to keep off
single vessels, but to defend themselves against any naval force.” Dearborn also hinted
that Boston was pursuing the same course.66
Rep. Jonathan Dayton (F-N.J.) demanded that states cease to take fortification
into their own hand, declaring that no federal money could be spent until states stopped
planning massive works on their own initiative which would require immense federal
expenditures to complete, and instead waited for some representative of the Federal
government to examine their harbors again and then the state should submit the whole
sum required, not simply demand more allocations. At present, he said, New York might
as well “have thrown money into the sea.”67
New York’s representatives responded aggressively. Williams argued that “peace
was the season to prepare for war” and that after New York had expended “two hundred
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thousand dollars” because the state had seen that congress was not “disposed
appropriate money for defending the state of New York and that now, all their work
would go to ruin without a small federal appropriation. Jonathan Havens (DR-N.Y.) said
his state lacked confidence that should they put the matter in federal hands, “that the
Government would do anything effectual.”
The representatives of other seaports also came to New York’s defense, but
simultaneously inserted the demands of their own harbor for more and better forts.
William Smith (F-S.C.) declared that he believed the fortifications the state of New York
had begun itself were on a “noble scale, and that it would be disgraceful to the United
States to suffer them to go to ruin.” But he reminded Congress, “the port of New York
was in a better state than that of Charleston.” Charleston, which “had expended twenty
thousand dollars” did not have the resources of New York but had done what it could,
and thus merited federal consideration of at least the funds to keep what it had built
maintained. Charleston’s forts immediately became the subject and Mr. Livingston of
New York immediately jumped up to defend Charleston in turn.
The debate over New York’s excessive fortification illustrates that maritime states
pushed harder for more permanent and extensive fortifications than Congress, spurred
on by their constituents. New York’s plans were the most controversial, but it was not
alone: Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Charleston and others all came under similar
scrutiny.
As we have also seen, in Congress itself, the representatives of seaport states
consistently stood up for the defense of their own individual seaports while occasionally
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uniting as a commercial city bloc. This is because congressional support for fortifications
was directly tied to the demands of seaport inhabitants.
Even without bringing rural representatives into the picture, seaport
representatives often had difficult uniting as a block around their similar interests,
bickering over the small pool of Federal funds rural majorities were willing to provide.
However, just as the tussle between towns like Norfolk and Portsmouth over who’s
harbor should be fortified reveals how much the inhabitants of each cared about being
protected by fortifications, so the seemingly myopic tendency of congressmen to seek
funds for the seaports of their own states at the expense of general systems of national
defense exposes the strong links between congressman and their constituents when it
came to fortifications. Alongside politicians’ statements about general national interest or
even the broad interest of the commercial city bloc was a constant jockeying to log-roll
their particular towns as much defense as possible.
For example, In 1794, Congressman Murray (F, Md.) attempted to get his own
Annapolis, Maryland, added to the First System list of cities to be fortified, specifically
justifying the measure by reference to the “wishes of his constituents.”68 During the
crisis over the cession of lands for forts arguments broke out not just between urban
and rural coalitions, but between the representatives of individual seaport-possessing
states as each sought to find the political angle that would result in the most money in
their pockets. As New York and Massachusetts argued that federal negligence had
forced them to go it alone on fortifications, and therefore they were still entitled to
federal funds even if they didn’t cede land to the federal government, representatives of
those seaports who had already ceded land loudly complained that they certainly,
68
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having followed all the rules and placed themselves at the mercy of the Federal
government, were entitled to more funds.69 In 1798, Thomas Blount (DR-N.C.) spoke in
favor of the fortifications of Oracoke, North Carolina specifically.70 William Barry Grove,
a Federalist from the same state, concurred adding that Wilmington and Georgetown,
N.C., “had not a gun to protect them against any privateer that might come against
them” and that he “could produce letters to show that the people in that quarter consider
themselves to be in a very dangerous situation” and thus he could not “sit silent and see
the State from whence he came wholly neglected.”71 In this instance, the
representatives of New York, for whom the appropriation on the floor was already
designated, somewhat disingenuously argued that their was no need to designate more
ports and that the president could sort out which places were most important (New York
City of course, universally being considered the most important port). 72 Soon later,
Charleston’s representatives added their two cents about the needs of their harbor,
argued New York had enough money, and so on.73 More examples could be listed, but a
quote about the land cession fortification issue from Rep. John Swanwick (DR-PA), a
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former Philadelphia merchant, sums up the localism of congressmen with regard to
fortifications,
It was very evident, he thought, from the conduct of that gentleman
himself [Mr. Livingston of New York] that they could not altogether diverse
themselves of feelings of locality. Neither did he think it necessary that
they should do so. It was perhaps an advantage to the whole, that every
man had a propensity to do that which would correspond to the interests
of his constituents; for, by this means, the whole Union would have a fair
chance of being equally seven, since it was equally represented.74
An undoubtedly major factor in the solicitousness of representatives for their own ports
was the close interest with which fortifications were followed in ports. Few seaport
congressmen had the luxury of dispassionately considering what places would best be
fortified, and even the handful who were truly convinced of the uselessness of
fortifications in turn lobbied aggressively for their seaports to be provided with gunboats,
floating batteries or whatever other security measure they preferred. As well as through
elections, seaport inhabitants maintained contact with their representatives and with
congress as a whole through frequent petitions.
Consistently New Yorkers argued to Congress through petitions from the state
legislature, the city corporation and various combinations of citizens in favor of greater
harbor defenses. In 1798, Samuel Sewall, (F-Mass.) called attention to a memorial of
the New York Chamber of Commerce on the insecurity of the harbor. 75 In 1806, George
Clinton (DR-N.Y.) referred to two more petitions from New York in favor of greater harbor
fortifications, one from the “merchants of the city” and one from the “Corporation” itself
(the metropolitan government).76 An 1807 resolution from the state legislature to
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Congress asked for “a plan of durable and permanent defence for the port of New York”
requiring permanent upkeep by “annual appropriations” or a “general provision” of a
large sum that, citing the commercial and revenue value of their city.77 More informally
than presenting a petition to be read on the floor, congressmen tended to offhandedly
reference how many of their constituents had requested defenses in their speeches.
The Congressional debates on fortifications were complex and a great deal
shifted from 1794 to the War of 1812. By 1806, a confusing situation emerged in which
many non-seaport representatives from inland states aggressively demanded the
protection of American sailors and seaports, but advanced gunboats as a defense while
a specific faction referred to as the War Hawks pushed for war with Great Britain in the
name of sailor’s rights and the national honor all the while angling at the conquest of
Canada. Throughout this period, seaport representatives continued to advocate
fortifications and avoid war with Great Britain, which could and did ruin American
commerce overnight. Fortification advocates also clashed with the supporters of
gunboats, which they (correctly) argued were of only limited military use, more
expensive than fortifications and generally incapable of fighting European battleships.
Much work remains to be done to distinguish different strains of the military controversy
in this critical period during which much of the relationship between the American
federal system and warfare was first laid down, but hopefully this paper has
demonstrated that fortifications must play a significant part in this debate.
As a final note on how important fortifications were to the politics of the era, when
pushed to the edge, their advocates of both parties were occasionally unafraid to
actually threaten secession from the United States. In his major speech of 1806, Josiah
77
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Quincy (F-Mass.) declared, “It requires only some real misfortune, resulting from your illtimed parsimony, or misplaced affections, to rouse a spirit in the commercial states
which will shake this Union to its foundation.”78 Orchard Cook (DR-Mass.) concurred in
1807, but with a classically republican twist, arguing that cities had an eternal right to
expect to be fortified by their leaders, and if those leaders failed to do so, they forfeited
their sovereignty.
Sir, I will ask, can any be hardy enough to claim allegiance, and at the
same time refuse protection? Will you issue decrees of
disenfranchisement and excommunication? Will you put citizens at the
ban of empire, and still claim of them obedience and revenue? If you
should act thus unjustly, will you not drive the oppressed into rebellion?
Will they not be justified in following the example of the ancient
Thessalians, a people inhabiting a frontier State of Greece, who, when
threatened with a Persian invasion, asked that their country be fortified,
and who, being refused, joined the invaders to subdue their own
countrymen.
For the Federalist and the Democratic Republican reps. from Massachusetts alike,
fortifications were something worth fighting for and something citizens had a right to and
were oppressed if they lacked. Their fire should convince us that as long as the fortress
remains peripheral to the historical account of the military politics of this period, our
picture of the first few decades of the American republican experiment will be
incomplete.
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VI. Conclusion
There is one understandable reason for the lack of historical interest in American
east coast fortresses, both those built from 1794 to 1812 and those of the nineteenth
century in general: very few ever fired their guns in anger. The unromantic paradox of
fortifications is that, while the most powerful offense is obvious because it wins great
victories, the most invulnerable defense is invisible because it deters attack. This makes
it very difficult to tell whether a fortification which was never attacked was very powerful
or simply unnecessary. Regardless, either one makes for a rather dull story of
maintenance and garrison duty, of a weary battle with boredom and the elements rather
than a fiery tale of bloody assaults and repulses.
The War of 1812 was the only major testing period for the First and Second
Systems described in this essay. In that conflict, the British Navy quickly blockaded
American seaports and descended upon the American coasts, launching a series of
destructive amphibious raids. The primary purpose of these raids was to take pressure
off Canada, which the Americans were opportunistically attempting to conquer. The
British also sought to spread terror, punishing Americans for outrages against the
Canadians, for the temerity to declare war and for the last century’s rebellion itself. The
British also hoped to splinter the American union, both by deliberately sparing the antiwar Federalist New England and punishing the pro-war Democratic Republican South.
With this in mind, and also considering heavily fortified New York City, the richest
American prize, too tough a nut to crack, the British descended upon the Chesapeake
Bay in force in 1814, and the seaport communities experienced the nightmare they had
feared for the past two decades. In the Chesapeake at least, regardless of the causes
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of the War of 1812, seaport fears of devastation, contribution and pillage turned out to
be rather well-founded.
According to Marion Breunig’s pioneering study of the power of localism in the
War of 1812, “A Tale of Two Cities: Washington and Baltimore during the War of 1812,”
the same urban initiative I have described as crucial to procuring fortifications was
critical to defending them. According to Breunig, in Washington, D.C., a grandly laid out
but barely built city lacking commerce, population, a strong sense of community and
independent political identity (and a city that never appeared as a vigorous advocate of
fortification for just these reasons in my narrative) was incapable of resisting a serious
British attack, and consequently experienced the nightmare of the seaports: full-scale
plunder, not to mention the purposeful destruction of its public buildings. Washington’s
smaller neighbors, Alexandria and Georgetown, escaped destruction only by giving
tribute “contributions” to the British (the two towns, disgusted by federal neglect, refused
to fly the American flag for a week after the British left).
When, in 1814, Baltimore became the target of British aggression, they found
themselves fighting a far tougher target due to local initiative. Samuel Smith, the former
Maryland congressional representative and an experienced soldier, took control of the
defense, intensively training the city’s militia long before the redcoats arrived. Local
mercantile elites, who were closely allied to their former house rep, and recognized
clearly that commercial Baltimore was an obvious target, flooded Smith’s efforts with
cash for patriotism and property. The people of Baltimore rallied and prepared strong
earthworks around the entire city in multiple layer. As Breunig describes, even the new
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cathedral was fortified. In the harbor, Fort McHenry, the city’s First System fort, was also
readied to contest any attempt to force entry into the harbor.
Baltimore met the challenge successfully, aggressively contesting the first British
landing and falling back in order to their earthwork fortifications, forcing the British to
force the harbor to take the city, which required silencing the guns of Fort McHenry. On
September 12, British vessels bombarded Fort McHenry’s garrison in a brutal 24-hour
barrage that left the defenders mentally shattered but unbroken, and event forever
immortalized in American memory by “The Star-Spangled Banner, the song, written by
an eyewitness, which became the United States national anthem. In Baltimore, the
victory as is celebrated “Defender’s Day” every September 12 since. While most First
and Second System forts are almost forgotten by the American people, the only one to
actually face fire became one of the country’s greatest patriotic icons.
There is a great connection between the localized, community-centric defense of
American seaports (in large part on their fortifications), described by Marion Breunig
and the community-motivated campaign of seaports to procure those fortifications,
which this paper has detailed, just as the lyrics of the “Star-Spangled
Banner” (especially if we consider the additional lyric not sung at baseball games about
shooting up “despots” and “hirelings”) have more than a passing resemblance to the
“Fortification Song” of two decades earlier.
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VII. Appendix: Fortress Form and Function
An understanding of the history of the design and function of European-style
harbor fortifications is necessary to appreciate the First System (1794) and Second
System (1808). In the Middle Ages, a European fortress was comprised simply of a
series of thin masonry walls (curtains) which obstructed passage, topped with platforms
(parapets) from which defenders could assail attackers with missiles. The invention of
cannons necessitated radical design changes in fortifications as existing masonry
curtains were too thin and brittle to either withstand besieging cannonballs or bear the
weight of defensive artillery itself. As a consequence, masonry curtains shrank vertically
and expanded horizontally, the curtain being backed by a great quantity of earth to
absorb the shock of enemy fire and enlarge its parapet so it could mount defensive
artillery. The curtain remained the primary obstacle to attacking infantry, and to
compensate for the decrease in height of the curtain a deep (and generally dry) ditch
was dug in from of the wall, the earth from which was piled up at the front of the ditch,
creating a additional mass of earth (called a glacis) interposed between the curtain and
enemy fire, sloped to deflect such shots. Similarly, the towers of medieval fortresses,
which allowed defenders to flank attacks against the curtain, became lower and
broader, forming great projecting triangular bastions capable of both flanking the ditch
and covering the faces of the next bastion in the line.
A fortification of this design (often colloquially referred to as the “Vauban” style,
after the great seventeenth century French master of besieging this mode of fortress)
could be constructed with more or less permanence and sophistication. In the American
colonies, which were rarely provided with professional engineers by Great Britain and
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never possessed an engineering academy of their own, both landlocked and coastal
fortifications were generally simpler versions of European designs along these
principles. The curtains of colonial American fortifications were generally revetted with
timber rather than stone and featured a variety of timber stockades and blockhouses
best suited for fighting non-European natives or foreign colonists lacking substantial
artillery.
In the specific context of harbor defense, artillery was placed so as to command
the narrowest approaches to harbors, through which hostile ships would be forced to
pass to get within firing range of the town itself, or, if no such choke points were
available, were placed on high ground near the shore in the city itself, to drive off ships
when they came too close. While enemies could certainly disembark from their ships
outside the range of the fortress’s guns and march on the city on foot, doing so would
give the defenders time to assemble and prepare their landward defenses. On the
simplest level, a coastal fortification could just be a number of cannons placed at a
strategic point aimed at the harbor. The purpose of instead placing guns on a fortress
was to provide the guns with protection, an ideal platform and with defense against a
landward attack. A harbor would often be defended not only by one specific fort, but by
a whole layout of multiple strategically placed batteries with varying degrees of earth
and masonry protection.79
Historians have recognized that the First and Second Systems were, technically
speaking, a mixed bag. Most works were simple earthworks, but a few were substantial
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permanent masonry ones. Historians have generally not sufficiently recognized
however, that was distinguished the strong from the weak was that the strong were built
at seaports with vastly superior resources.
The American First System was primarily composed of informal earthwork
batteries (and many more were constructed independently by small communities with
their own resources) but included a handful of large masonry-revetted bastioned
pentagon fortresses. The Second System included several traditional works of various
qualities but its centerpieces were a set of forts in a modern radical departure from the
traditional bastioned trace, built according to the theories of Marc de René de
Montalembert, a maverick French engineer who posited that tall masonry towers with
multiple tiers of guns could provide overwhelming firepower capable of rendering a
fortress invulnerable to attack.80
More informally, cannons mounted on a raised earthwork, with or without a ditch
and glacis, could form a moderately effective fortification. While both coastal and
landlocked cities in Europe the Europeans colonies were sometimes entirely
surrounded by an enciente of such fortifications, complete fortification of cities was very
rare in the later colonial period and unknown in the early national period. For coastal
defense, in both American and European seaports, fortifications ranging from massive,
complex masonry-revetted fortresses to simple earthwork batteries were placed so that
their guns commanded the approaches into the harbor and so as to prevent any ship
from getting close enough to the urban center to bombard it.
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Fortifications of different strengths were commonly defined by their
“permanence.” An “impermanent fortification” was one composed of only earthworks
and timber and thus highly vulnerable to erosion and rot. Such works were usually kept
small and not permanently garrisoned. Difficult to maintain, a temporary fortification
could be expected to decay into uselessness within a few years. The general
expectation was that such works could be erected and manned quickly and cheaply
during a crisis, and then neglected.
A permanent fortification was an entirely different matter. Composed of masonry
as well as earth, a permanent fortification, though initially far more expensive than an
earthwork, was far more durable, and if garrisoned, could be quite cheaply maintained.
Indeed, a permanent masonry fortress, large and capable of mounting scores or even
hundred of artillery pieces and soldier, was expected to be permanently garrisoned even
in peacetime for both maintenance and site security.
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